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By Eric French and Jae Song*
This paper exploits the effectively random assignment of judges to 
Disability Insurance cases to estimate the causal impact of Disability 
Insurance receipt on labor supply. We find that benefit receipt reduces 
labor force participation by 26 percentage points three years after a 
disability determination decision, although the reduction is smaller 
for older people, college graduates, and those with mental illness. 
OLS and instrumental variables estimates are similar. Furthermore, 
over 60 percent of those denied benefits by an administrative law 
judge are subsequently allowed benefits within ten years, showing 
that most applicants apply, reapply, and appeal until they get ben-
efits. (JEL H55, J14, J22, K23)
This paper presents new evidence on the effect of Disability Insurance (DI)/Supplemental Security Income (SSI) receipt on labor supply. We compare the 
earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received Disability Insurance 
benefits to the earnings patterns of those who applied for benefits but were denied.
Relative to Bound’s (1989) classic study on earnings of rejected DI applicants, 
we make the following key improvement. We address the fact that those who are 
denied benefits are potentially different than those who are allowed. Using Social 
Security administrative data, we exploit the assignment of DI cases to administra-
tive law judges (ALJs), an assignment which is essentially random. We document 
large differences in allowance rates across judges, and show that these differences 
are unrelated to the health or earnings potential of DI applicants. Using instrumental 
variables procedures, we use judge specific allowance rates to predict allowance of 
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individual cases. We then use predicted allowance to estimate the effect of allow-
ance on labor supply.
We find that three years after assignment to an ALJ, DI benefit allowance reduces 
earnings $4,059 per year and labor force participation 26 percentage points. As it 
turns out, our estimates are not very sensitive to accounting for the fact that those 
who are denied benefits are potentially different than those who are allowed: instru-
mental variables estimates are very close to OLS estimates for those assigned to an 
ALJ. These estimates imply a high labor supply elasticity with respect to the  after-tax 
wage. The earnings and participation elasticities are 1.8 and 1.5, respectively.
However, many initially denied DI applicants appeal or reapply. In fact, we find 
that 40 percent of applicants who are denied benefits by an ALJ are eventually 
allowed benefits within three years. Furthermore, 40 percent of those not allowed 
benefits three years after an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benefits within ten 
years of assignment. In order to be allowed benefits, the applicant cannot earn above 
a small amount. As a result, few applicants work during the appeal process, even 
though they are currently not receiving benefits. This has an important impact on our 
estimated effects. When we measure earnings and DI benefit allowance five years 
after assignment to an ALJ, rather than three, we find that DI allowance reduces 
earnings $4,915 per year, rather than $4,059.
Furthermore, we estimate labor supply responses for different subgroups of the 
population. We identify many subgroups of the population whose labor supply is not 
sensitive to benefit receipt, such as those over age 55, college graduates, and those 
with mental illness. Because we have the population of DI applicants whose case 
was heard by a judge, we obtain precise estimates of the labor supply responses, 
even for these narrow subgroups of the population.
Using a marginal treatment effects approach, we find that marginal applicants 
handled by stricter judges (who allow benefits to relatively few applicants) have 
slightly smaller labor supply responses than the marginal applicants heard by lenient 
judges. This is consistent with the view that the marginal applicant handled by a 
strict judge is slightly less able to work than the marginal case handled by a more 
lenient judge. The marginal case heard by a stricter judge is, however, slightly more 
likely to get benefits in the future. This suggests that these strict judges delay benefit 
receipt rather than deny benefit receipt.
Section I gives a literature review, Section II describes the DI system, Section III 
describes our estimation methods, Section IV shows data, Section V reports basic 
estimates, and Section VI concludes.
I. Literature Review
Disability insurance is one of America’s largest social insurance programs. In 2005, 
4.1 percent of men ages 25–64 were receiving DI benefits (Autor and Duggan 2006). 
Furthermore, many disabled individuals with low income receive Supplemental 
Security Income benefits. Most DI and SSI beneficiaries also receive health insur -
ance benefits through Medicare (for DI beneficiaries) or Medicaid (for SSI benefi-
ciaries). The combined cost of these programs was $428 billion in 2008 (Livermore, 
Stapleton, and O’Toole 2011), making these programs several times more expensive 
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than unemployment insurance. These rapidly rising costs have generated many policy 
proposals to reform the system (Autor and Duggan 2010; Burkhauser and Daly 2011).
DI is often cited as a major cause of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 
55–64. In order to better understand the labor supply effects of DI, Bound (1989) 
compared earnings patterns of individuals who applied for and received DI benefits 
to those who applied for benefits but were denied. He found that those who were 
allowed benefits were less likely to work than those who were denied, but the effect 
was modest. Even those who were denied benefits had participation rates of less 
than 50 percent after denial of benefits. The difference in participation rates of those 
allowed versus denied was 34 percentage points. Thus, Bound (1989) inferred that, 
at most, 50 percent of rejected male applicants during the 1970s would have worked 
were it not for the availability of disability benefits. These estimates imply that DI 
is responsible for well under half of the fall in labor supply of American men aged 
55–64 over the 1970s and 1980s.
Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011) find that these labor supply responses 
have if anything grown over time because applicants are now younger and have 
potentially less severe health impairments. Thus, the labor supply response to DI 
receipt might be bigger now than during our sample from the 1990s. Consistent with 
Von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011), Duggan and Imberman (2008) point 
out that 13.5 percent of DI awards in 1982–1983 were for mental disorders, while in 
2002–2003 it was 25.7 percent. Nevertheless, Bound’s (1989) original estimate is 
still very close to the most recent OLS estimates. For example, Bound’s (1989) esti-
mate was 0.34. Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) use recent administrative data, 
and find that the estimate is 0.35. It is worth noting that our OLS estimates are 0.27, 
smaller than those of Bound (1989); Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013); and Von 
Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011). The reason for this is that they use estimates 
from the initial stage, whereas we use estimates from the ALJ stage.
Parsons (1991) and Bound (1989, 1991) discuss three key criticisms of Bound’s 
approach. First, those who are denied benefits are different than those who are 
allowed. Differences in labor supply between those denied and allowed are partly 
due to the effect of DI, but also partly due to the two groups having different propen-
sities to work, even when receiving the same DI treatment. People whose applica-
tions were denied are likely to be in better health, which, all else equal, should make 
them more likely to work, which is what Bound (1989) argued. However, those who 
are denied benefits also tend to have very intermittent work histories (Lahiri, Song, 
and Wixon 2008), suggesting that their non-health characteristics make them less 
likely to work. For this reason, OLS might be biased up or down. As a result, it is 
not clear whether those who are denied are more or less likely to work in the absence 
of benefits, and whether OLS overstates or understates the work disincentive effects 
of DI.
It is this problem that our study addresses. Our identification approach compares 
those who are denied benefits to those who are otherwise similar but are allowed 
benefits. Our approach complements the approach of Chen and van der Klaauw 
(2008). They use the fact that in many cases, an individual aged 54 applying for 
benefits would be denied, although the same individual at age 55 would be allowed. 
Our estimated labor supply effects are similar to Chen and van der Klaauw (2008). 
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However, we add to their analysis by providing larger sample sizes. This allows for 
more precise estimates. It also allows us to document how the responsiveness of 
labor supply varies with demographics, because we can obtain precise estimates for 
narrow subgroups.
Our estimated effects are also similar to Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013), 
who use assignment of disability examiners at the initial stage of the DI application 
process as a source of variation in allowance rates. This paper makes three contribu-
tions relative to that paper. The first is that judges are assigned to cases on a rota-
tional basis, which makes the assignment process random for all practical purposes, 
whereas examiners at the initial stage may specialize. Thus, our source of varia-
tion is more clearly exogenous. Second, we obtain more precise estimates, allowing 
us to document how the responsiveness of labor supply varies with demographics. 
Third, our data includes earnings and the share of individuals who are allowed or 
are appealing up to ten years after the ALJ allowance decision, whereas they have 
data only on earnings and the share working, and only up to three years after an ini-
tial allowance decision. This is important because we find that 40 percent of those 
not allowed benefits three years after an assignment to an ALJ are allowed benefits 
within ten years of assignment.
Our paper, Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), and Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 
(2013) all obtain identification at different stages of the adjudication process, and 
thus our estimated effects correspond to different pools of applicants. Thus, the 
three studies are of independent interest. For example, the disparities in allowance 
rates across ALJs has received a great deal of attention in policy circles (Daub et 
al. 2006), legal studies (Taylor 2007), and the popular press (Paletta 2011). Despite 
the differences between our paper, Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), and Maestas, 
Mullen, and Strand (2013), all three papers produce similar results and reinforce 
each other’s findings.
The second criticism of Bound’s approach is that many individuals who are 
denied continue to appeal the denial. In order to be deemed eligible for benefits, 
the individual cannot work while appealing the denial. Thus, many of those who 
are denied do not work in order to increase the chances of successful appeal. If the 
option to appeal had not existed, more of these individuals might have returned 
to the labor force. We partly address this problem by estimating the labor supply 
response to whether the individual was allowed benefits three years after assign-
ment to a judge, although we show that many reapply and appeal well after three 
years. We provide new evidence on the share of denied individuals who appeal and 
subsequently receive benefits.1
Third, in order to apply for benefits, the individual must be out of the labor force 
for a period of time. For example, the individual can only work a very limited 
amount in the five months before applying for benefits and during the time that they 
are appealing a denial. During that period, human capital may depreciate (Autor 
et al. 2011). Thus, the individual may not be able to return to her previous job, even 
1 Understanding subsequent allowance and appeal is also an important input into dynamic models of DI applica-
tion and receipt, such as Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidmann (2010); Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2011); 
Low and Pistaferri (2011).
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if she is healthy. In other words, the very act of applying for benefits reduces ability 
to work.2 Our study does not address this issue.
II. The Disability Insurance System
A. Labor Supply Incentives
This section shows that the DI beficiaries face strong work disincentives. Both 
income effects (through the value of the disability benefit) and substitution effects 
(beneficiaries will lose benefits if they earn above the substantial gainful activity 
(SGA) level) indicate that DI should reduce labor supply. If an applicant is allowed 
DI benefits, the dollar amount of benefits depends on previous labor earnings.
Disabled worker benefits averaged $1,130 per month among DI beneficiaries in 
2013 (Social Security Administration 2013). Because the benefit schedule is pro-
gressive, disability benefits replace 60 percent and 40 percent of previous labor 
income for those at the tenth and fiftieth percentile of the earnings distribution, 
respectively (Autor and Duggan 2006).3 Those receiving benefits can earn up to 
the SGA level, which was $500 per month (in current dollars) during the 1990s and 
$1,040 per month in 2013. Those earning more than this amount for more than a 
nine month Trial Work Period lose their benefits.
Furthermore, DI benefits likely reduce labor supply through a third channel—
Medicare eligibility. Individuals receiving DI benefits are eligible for Medicare after a 
two year waiting period. Medicare largely eliminates the value of  employer-provided 
health insurance. For those working at a firms providing health insurance, Medicare 
eliminates an important work incentive (French and Jones 2011). Livermore, 
Stapleton, and O’Toole (2011) show that federal and state governments spend more 
on health care than on cash benefits for the disabled.
Disabled individuals with especially weak earnings histories and low asset levels 
are eligible for a related program called Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSI 
benefits are not a function of previous labor income. The Federal Maximum SSI 
benefit level was $386 per month in 1990 and $710 in 2013. Some states supple-
ment this benefit. Benefits are reduced by $0.50 for every dollar of earnings above a 
small disregard level. Individuals drawing SSI may also be immediately eligible for 
Medicaid, the government provided health insurance program for the poor (Rupp 
and Riley 2011). Many people draw both DI and SSI benefits concurrently.
Relatively few people lose disability benefits for reasons other than death.4 For 
example, of 7.1 million individuals (DI worker beneficiaries) drawing DI benefits 
in 2007, 0.5 percent had benefits terminated because they earned above the SGA 
2 Moore (2012) examines the health and employment effects of the removal of DI benefits for those who were 
claiming benefits as a result of an alcohol or drug addiction. Interestingly, Moore finds that among those losing 
benefits, those receiving DI benefits for five years are at least as likely to return to work as those receiving benefits 
for one year. This suggests that many individuals can return to work, even after a long absence from the labor force.
3 The more relevant replacement rate is the benefit amount relative to what she could earn in the labor market 
after application. This replacement rate is likely higher than 60–40 percent because potential earnings of applicants 
are likely lower after application.
4 DI benefits are converted into retiree benefits once the beneficiary turns the normal retirement age. The statis-
tics above are for DI benefits before the conversion to retiree benefits.
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level for an extended period of time in 2007. Another 0.3 percent had benefits termi-
nated because they were deemed medically able to work after a continuing disability 
review, which is a periodic review of the health of DI beneficiaries (Social Security 
Administration 2008).5
The disability allowance decision is high stakes. If the individual is allowed ben-
efits, that individual is typically given disability benefits until the normal retirement 
age (age 65 during the 1990s and now 66), when these benefits are converted into 
Social Security benefits. If an individual began receiving the the average benefit 
($1,004 per month) at age 50, he would receive these benefits until age 65. Thus, 
these benefits would amount to about 15 years × 12 months × $1,004 = $181,000 
over the course of his life. This would be in addition to Medicare benefits.
B. Determining Eligibility for DI Benefits
An individual is deemed eligible for benefits if they have met certain work require-
ments and if they are deemed medically disabled. Although the exact algorithm is 
complex (see Hu et al. 2001 and Benítez-Silva et al. 1999 for details), one of two 
conditions must be met for the individual to be deemed disabled.
The first condition is “listed impairment.” Individuals that meet one of over 
100 specific listed impairments are given immediate benefits. Examples include 
statutory blindness (i.e., corrected vision of 20/200 or worse in the better eye) and 
multiple sclerosis.6
The second condition is inability to perform either past work or other work. This 
condition involves a combination of medical impairment and vocational factors 
such as education, work experience, and age. These cases can be especially dif-
ficult to evaluate. Myers (1993), a former Social Security Administration Deputy 
Commissioner, points out that “if a worker has a disability so severe that he or she 
can do only sedentary work, then disability is presumed in the case where the person 
is aged 55 and older, has less than a high school education, and has worked only 
in unskilled jobs, but this is not so presumed in the case of a similar young worker. 
Clearly, borderline cases arise frequently and are difficult to adjudicate in an equi-
table manner!”
The disability determination process is a multistep process. Figure 1 shows the 
share of applicants who are allowed at different steps during our sample period 
(described in detail in Section IV and Appendix A). After an initial waiting period of 
five months, DI applicants have their case reviewed by a Disability Determination 
Service review board. Figure 1 shows that 39 percent of applicants are allowed and 
61 percent are denied at this stage. At this stage the most clear-cut cases are allowed, 
such as those with a listed impairment. Cases that are more difficult to judge (such 
5 Longitudinal statistics show that the percentage of new beneficiaries who eventually leave for work, at least 
temporarily, is several times higher (Liu and Stapleton 2011). Nevertheless, the share leaving for work is smaller 
than the share leaving because of death.
6 Note that many people who meet the listings do, in fact, work. For example, anybody who is permanently deaf, 
blind, or unable to walk would meet the listings, but many such individuals do work.
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as musculoskeletal problems) are usually denied at this stage.7 About half of all 
applicants denied for medical reasons appeal at the disability determination service 
reconsideration stage. About 10 percent of those that appeal are allowed benefits at 
this stage (Social Security Administration 2008). Sixty days after the disability deter-
mination service decision, a DI appeal can be requested. DI appeals are reviewed in 
court by administrative law judges (ALJs) after a delay of about one year.8 Fourteen 
percent of all initial claims, or 59 percent of all claims that are appealed, are allowed 
at the ALJ level.9 If the case is denied at the ALJ level, the applicant can then appeal 
to the Appeals Council level. If the applicant is denied at this level, she can then 
appeal after 60 days at the Federal Court level. However, Figure 1 shows that appeals 
at the higher levels are rarely successful: less than 2 percent of all initial claimants 
receive benefits at the Appeals Council or Federal Court level. Lastly, denied appli-
cants can end their appeal and reapply for benefits. The last line on Figure 1 includes 
those who reapply for benefits. Another 7 percent of all initial claims are eventually 
allowed benefits through a reapplication. Thirty-three percent do not get benefits at 
any stage after ten years. Figure A1 in Appendix A shows that most who do not get 
benefits after a few years end their appeals. However, ten years after initially claim-
ing, 6 percent are still in the process of appealing or reapplying.
Because we identify the causal effect of DI on labor supply using variation at 
the ALJ level, the estimated effect applies only to marginal cases. The least healthy 
7 At each point in time, we include those who are alive and younger than 65. Thus, for ten years after filing, our 
sample includes those who were under 55 at the time of filing. Those under 55 at the time of filing have lower allow-
ance rates: their initial allowance rate is 29 percent instead of the full sample initial allowance rate of 39 percent.
8 Judges can make one of three decisions: allowed, denied, or remand. A “remand” is a request for more infor-
mation from the disability determination service. Our measure of “allowed” is the final determination at the ALJ 
stage, and thus includes the final decision on remands.
9 The full allowance rate at this stage is slightly higher than 59 percent. Our 59 percent allowance rate is for our 
estimation sample, which drops prereviewed cases that have higher allowance rates.
Figure 1. Allowance at Different Stages of the Applications and Appeals Process
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individuals, such as those with listed impairments, will almost always be allowed 
at the Disability Determination Service stage. The healthiest individuals will almost 
always be denied by every judge and on every appeal. Thus, our results may not be 
fully generalizable to all DI applicants. However, these marginal cases are of great 
interest, because these are the individuals most likely to be affected by changes in 
the leniency of the appeals level of the DI system.
C. Assignment of DI cases to Judges
Judicial independence means that judges have a great deal of latitude to deter-
mine eligibility (Taylor 2007). As a result, two different judges can have very 
different allowance rates even though their caseloads are very similar.
Administrative law judges (ALJs) are assigned to appeals cases on a rotational 
basis, with the oldest cases receiving priority at each hearing office.10 Thus, the 
oldest case is given to the judge who most recently finished a case. Therefore, con-
ditional on applying at a given office at a given point in time, the initial assignment 
of cases to judges is “essentially random” (Daub et al. 2006). Judges do not get to 
pick the cases they handle. Judges are not assigned cases based on the expertise of 
the judge. Furthermore, an individual cannot choose an alternate judge after being 
assigned a judge.
The initially assigned judge is not necessarily the judge who decides the case. 
Paletta (2011) documents a judge who took assigned cases from other judges and 
made decisions on those cases. Thus, the cases were not randomly assigned to the 
deciding judge.11 Fortunately, however, we have information on the assigned judge 
in addition to the deciding judge. Although the deciding judge is not necessarily 
randomly assigned, the initially assigned judge is. We use the initial assignment to 
a judge as our source of exogenous variation. As it turns out, the initially assigned 
judge is the same as the deciding judge in 96 percent of all cases.
The assigned judge is, for all practical purposes, randomly assigned conditional 
on hearing office and day. However, individuals are not randomly assigned to hear-
ing offices. The zip code in which a person lives determines the hearing office to 
which they are assigned. The characteristics of applicants vary by location (e.g., 
black lung disease is more common near mining towns) as well as across time 
10 Title 5, Part III, Subpart B, Chapter 31, Subchapter I, Section 3105 of the US Code states that “Administrative 
law judges shall be assigned to cases in rotation so far as practicable” (United States 2007). The Social Security 
Administration’s Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) Volume I Chapter 2 Section 1–55 
states that “the Hearing Office Chief Administrative Law Judge generally assigns cases to ALJs from the master 
docket on a rotational basis, with the earliest (i.e., oldest) Request for Hearing receiving priority” (Social Security 
Administration 2009). HALLEX gives 11 exceptions to this rule. For example, the exceptions include “critical 
cases,” such as individuals with terminal conditions and military service personnel, as well as remand cases. These 
cases are expedited and reviewed by Senior Attorneys. If there is a clear-cut decision to be made, then the Senior 
Attorney will make the decision without a hearing. If the case is not clear-cut, then the case is put back in the master 
docket and is assigned to a judge in rotation. Fortunately, we can identify cases that were decided without a hear-
ing and we delete them from our sample. Our analysis focuses on the remaining cases where there was a hearing.
11 Furthermore, an individual can potentially reject the assigned judge. For example, if an individual misses her 
court case, she may be reassigned to a different judge. Another possibility is that for some cases in remote areas, 
cases are held via video conference where the judge and claimant are not in the same room. Claimants can demand 
that the judge be present at a hearing, and thus the judge must travel to the claimant. Some judges refuse to travel, 
and thus another judge will be reassigned to the case.
VOL. 6 nO. 2 299french and song: disability insurance and labor supply
(e.g., the share of DI applicants listing mental illness as the main health problem has 
risen over time). For this reason we condition explicitly on hearing office and day in 
the estimations below. In doing so, we exploit only within hearing office-day varia-
tion in judge level leniency.
III. Estimating Equations
In order to estimate the effect of DI allowance on earnings and labor force partici-
pation, we use a two-step procedure. In the first step, we generate an instrumental 
variable that is a measure of judge leniency. Conditional on the hearing office and 
time, this variable is correlated with the probability of allowance, but is independent 
of health, ability, or preferences for work. In the second step, we use instrumental 
variables procedures to estimate the effect of DI on earnings, participation, appeals, 
and subsequent allowance.
A. Basic Specification
Our basic estimating approach is a modified instrumental variables regression 
where in a first stage we estimate
(1)   A it =  j i  γ t +  X i  δ At +  e it ,
where  A it is a 0–1 indicator equal to 1 if individual i is allowed benefits at time t, 
j i is a full set of judge indicator variables equal to 1 if judge j heard individual i ’s 
case, and  X i is a full set of hearing office-day indicators (equal 1 if individual i ’s 
case is assigned to that hearing office-day pair). The allowance rate and estimated 
parameters depend on time since many individuals initially denied benefits are sub-
sequently allowed.
For the second stage, we adopt the random coefficients model of Björklund and 
Moffitt (1987):
(2)   y i τ =  A it  ϕ i τ +  X i  δ y τ +  u i τ ,
where  y i τ is either earnings, participation, appeals or allowance at time τ. We allow 
for time τ ≥ t so that we can observe the effect of time t allowance on time τ out-
comes. We allow for heterogeneity in the parameter  ϕ i τ to capture heterogeneity in 
the effect of benefit receipt on earnings, appeals, and allowance, both across indi-
viduals and over time. We allow the variables  u i τ and  ϕ i τ to be potentially correlated 
with  A it , and with each other.12 Ideally, we would be able to identify the entire dis-
tribution of  ϕ i τ , although this is not possible. Below we describe what is identified 
given our data.
12 The residual  u i τ  is potentially correlated with  A it because those allowed benefits potentially have low earnings 
potential. Furthermore,  ϕ i τ is potentially correlated with  A it because more disabled people are unlikely to work, 
even when they get the benefit. Finally,  u i τ and  ϕ i τ are potentially correlated with each other since unhealthy indi-
viduals have lower earnings, whether or not they are allowed benefits.
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B. Estimating Equations
When estimating equation (2) we are confronted with three concerns. First, we 
wish to allow for heterogeneity in the parameter  ϕ i τ . Second, we have 1,497 judges 
in our sample, each of whom is a potential instrument. IV estimators can suffer from 
small sample bias when both the number of instruments and the number of obser-
vations is large (e.g., Hausman et al. 2012). Third, we have over 200,000 hearing 
office-day interactions in the covariate set  X i . To solve these three concerns, we use 
Doyle’s (2007) estimation procedure.
First, we demean variables by hearing office and day, and construct variables 
 ˜  A it =  A it −  _ A it ,  ˜  yi τ =  y i τ −  _ y i τ , where  _ A it and  _ y i τ are the mean values of  A it ,  y i τ con-
ditional on the hearing office and on the day that case i was assigned. Second, we 
create our instrumental variable (which we refer to as the judge allowance differen-
tial), which is
(3)   ˜  ji   γ1,−i =  1 _  n j − 1   ∑ s∈, s≠i 
 
  A s1 −  _ A s1 ,
where  n j is the number of cases heard by judge  j i over the sample period,  is the 
set of cases heard by judge  j i , and  _  A s1 is the mean allowance rate by ALJs at case 
s’s hearing office on the day case s was heard. This instrument is equivalent to the 
predicted allowance rate from OLS estimation of equation (1) where  A i1 (the ALJ 
decision) is the dependent variable, controlling for a full set of hearing office × time 
interactions, and leaving observation i out, as in a jackknife estimator. Thus, our 
instrument compares each decision with the corresponding office-day average prob-
ability to measure judge leniency. To the extent that a judge is more (less) lenient 
than other judges making decisions in that same office-day pair, the judge allowance 
differential (which by definition does not vary within judge over time) will be posi-
tive (negative).
Because we remove observation i, the estimated parameter   γ1,−i is independent of 
e it or  u i τ , even in a small sample. Third, we estimate the equations
(4)   ˜  A it =  λ t  ˜  ji   γ1,−i +  ϵ it ,
(5)   ˜  yi τ =  ϕ τ   A˜it +  ˜  ui τ ,
jointly using two stage least squares.
Given the above assumptions, Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) and French 
and Taber (2011) point out that this procedure identifies a weighted average of  ϕ i τ 
for the set of individuals affected by the instrument if three conditions are met. First, 
if judges are randomly assigned to cases, conditional on date and hearing office, 
then assignment satisfies the “independence assumption.” Second, if judges differ 
only in leniency and rank applicants the same with respect to severity, then Imbens 
and Angrist’s (1994) “monotonicity assumption” is satisfied. The monotonicity 
assumption implies that a case allowed by a strict judge will always be allowed by 
VOL. 6 nO. 2 301french and song: disability insurance and labor supply
a lenient one.13 Third, we assume that the instrument causes variation in allowance 
rates, sometimes known as the rank or existence condition. Sections VA and VB 
provide evidence on the extent to which the independence, monotonicity, and rank 
assumptions hold.14
C. marginal Treatment Effects
Section VF presents estimated marginal treatment effects (MTEs), which is the 
participation or earnings response for the individuals whose allowance decision is 
affected by changing the instrument. We estimate the equations
(7)   ˜  A it =  ∑ 
k=1
K
  λ k t  ( ˜  ji   γ1,−i ) k +  η it ,
(8)   ˜  yi τ =  ∑ 
k=1
K
  φ k τ   
∼
 (  A˜it ) k +  μ i τ ,
where   A˜it is the predicted value of  ˜  A it from equation (7), and “ ˜  ” represents a 
 demeaned variable, e.g.,  
∼
  A˜it 
k =   A˜it k −  
_
  A˜it 
k
 . As shown by Heckman, Urzua, and 
Vytlacil (2006) and French and Taber (2010), as well as Appendix C, the estimated 
MTE is
(9)  ∑  
k=1
 
K
 k  φ k τ  
∼
 (  A˜it ) k−1 =   E [  ϕ i τ | allowed if    A˜it ≥  a t ,  not allowed if    A˜it <  a t ] ,
where  a t is a particular realization of the (demeaned) allowance rate. Equation (9) 
shows that the MTE is the mean value of  ϕ i τ for those who would be allowed if their 
assigned judge allowed slightly higher than a share  a t of cases, and would be denied 
if assigned to a judge allowing slightly lower than a share  a t of cases. This value 
of  a t can also be interpreted as the (lack of) judge-observed severity of the case. 
As  a t increases, the instrument affects individuals with lower levels of severity. We 
estimate   γ1,−i from equation (3) as before, then estimate equations (7) and (8). The 
polynomials allow for the fact that Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006)  experiment 
13 Montonicity would not hold under the following scenario. Suppose one judge gives weight to education, 
skills, and social support system, and might allow somebody with low levels of these attributes but not a serious 
medical condition, while denying somebody with a demonstrably more severe medical condition but high levels of 
these attributes. If another judge used medical evidence alone she might flip these decisions, which would violate 
the monotonicity assumption.
14 More formally, we are assuming that allowance follows
(6)   A it = 1 {  g t ( Z i ) −  V i > 0 } ,
where  Z i = (  j i ,  X i ). The residual  V i can be thought of as the lack of severity of disability observed by the judge (but 
not by the econometrician). Equation (6) implies that all judges observe the same signal of disability  V i but differ in 
the level of severity necessary to be allowed benefits  g t ( Z i ). We assume  V i is independent of  j i and  X i , sometimes 
called the independence assumption. The latent variable framework gives rise to the monotonicity assumption. 
The rank condition is that plim   Ait = Pr( A it = 1 |  Z i ) is a non-trivial function of  Z i . Equation (6) is not identified 
because a monotonic transformation of both g( · ) and  V i delivers the same choice probabilities. As a normalization, 
we assume that  V i is distributed uniformly. Furthermore, as a functional form assumption we assume that g( · ) is 
linear in  j i and  X i so that we can estimate equation (6) using the regression function in equation (1).
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with different approaches to estimating the MTE, such as local polynomial smooth-
ers. They find that the polynomial approach works about as well as other procedures. 
Our Monte Carlo simulations suggest there is very little bias when using polynomials. 
Furthermore, the polynomial procedure is computationally feasible when allowing 
for large numbers of covariates, such as a full set of hearing office-day interactions. 
Appendix C provides more details on interpretation and estimation of the MTE.
IV. Data
Our initial sample is the universe of individuals who appealed either a DI or SSI 
benefit denial, and were assigned to an ALJ during the years 1990–1999. Using 
social security numbers, we match together data from the SSA 831 file, the Office 
of Hearings and Appeals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing Office 
Tracking System (HOTS), the Appeals Council Automated Processing System 
(ACAPS), the Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS), the Master Earnings 
File (MEF), and the Numerical Identification file (NUMIDENT). These data are 
described in greater detail in the Appendix. To the best of our knowledge, neither the 
OHACCS, HOTS, ACAPS, nor the LOTS datasets have been used for research pur-
poses before. We match in earnings, reapplications, and appeals data from 11 years 
prior to ten years following assignment to a judge. Thus, our earnings and appeals 
data run from 1979 to 2009.
We drop all observations heard by a judge who heard less than 50 cases during 
the sample period. We also drop cases with missing education information. Table A1 
in Appendix A presents more details on sample selection criteria and Table A2 pres-
ents mean age, race, earnings histories, and health of individuals in our estimation 
sample. Our main estimation sample has 1,779,825 DI cases, heard by 1,497 judges, 
with a mean allowance rate at the ALJ stage of 64.5 percent. Because many of those 
denied by an ALJ appeal or reapply for benefits, the allowance rate three years after 
assignment is 76.9 percent. All dollar amounts listed below are in 2006 dollars, 
deflated by the CPI.
These cases were heard at 227 different hearing offices (including tempo-
rary remote sites) over our ten year sample period. Cases were heard on 217,663 
hearing office-day pairs that our procedure must account for. Thus, on an aver-
age 1,779,825/217,748 = 8.2 cases were heard at each hearing office-day pair. 
Although 217,663 hearing office-day fixed effects is a large number to account for, 
recall that consistency in fixed effects estimators depends on the number of obser-
vations going to infinity, not the number of observations per fixed effect going to 
infinity. A non-trivial number of cases (242,908, or 13.7 percent of all cases) were 
heard when there was only a single judge at the hearing office on that day. Given 
that identification in our instrumental variables estimation comes from across judge 
variation in allowance rates within hearing office-day pairs, these observations do 
not contribute any identifying variation. Nevertheless, the other observations con-
tribute useful identifying information, as the results below show.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of judge specific allowance rates, both unconditional 
(panel A), and also conditional on hearing office-day (panel B). Specifically, panel A 
plots the distribution of average allowance rates of different judges over the sample 
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period. Panel B plots the judge allowance rate demeaned by hearing office and day 
(weighted by the number of cases heard); it is thus the histogram of our instrumental 
variable. Figure 2 shows that there is less variation in allowance rates after condi-
tioning on hearing office and day; one standard deviation in the unconditional judge 
allowance rate is 0.153, whereas conditional on hearing office and day it is 0.0659 
(when weighted by the number of cases handled by the judge). This means that being 
assigned to a judge one standard deviation more lenient than the average at her office 
increases the probability of allowance at the ALJ stage by 6.59 percentage points. 
Thus, conditioning on hearing office and day removes a non-trivial share of variation 
in judge allowance rates, but much of the variation is within hearing office and day.
V. Results
A. Establishing the Validity of the randomization
In previous sections we claimed that the assignment of cases to judges is random, 
conditional on hearing office and day. Random assignment implies that we cannot 
predict the judge using observable characteristics of the judge’s caseload. Table 1 
presents tests of this hypothesis.
First we consider which variables predict allowance. Column 1 of Table 1 presents 
estimates from a regression of an allowance indicator (demeaned by  hearing office 
and day) on the age, race, earnings histories, and health conditions of individuals in 
Figure 2. Allowance Rate of ALJs Demeaned, and Demeaned by Hearing Office and Day
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our estimation sample. Women, older individuals, whites, those with strong attach-
ment to the labor market, high earners, those represented by a lawyer, and those who 
did not complete high school are more likely to be allowed benefits. Column 2 pres-
ents t-statistics (all standard errors throughout are clustered by judge). It shows that 
these differences are highly statistically significant. The  r 2 shows that the covariates 
explain 3.9 percent of the variation in allowance rates.
Table 1—Predictors of Allowance and Judge Allowance Differential
Dependent variable: 
allowed
Dependent variable:  
judge allowance differential
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Sex
Female 0.0290 22.9 0.0002 0.9
Panel B. Age
45 to 54 0.0484 37.3 −0.0003 −1.3
55 to 59 0.1379 54.5 −0.0005 −1.0
60 or older 0.1476 49.7 −0.0004 −0.6
Panel c. race
Black −0.0497 −23.1 0.0001 0.1
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown −0.0215 −7.0 −0.0001 0.0
Panel D. Labor force participation and income
Average participation rate, years −11 to −2 0.0082 24.9 0.0000 0.1
Average earnings/1,000,000, years −11 to −2  
 (2006 dollars)
0.9480 10.2 −0.0002 0.0
Panel E. represented by lawyer
Represented by lawyer 0.0743 41.8 0.0008 1.0
Panel F. Application type
SSDI −0.0027 −1.7 −0.0004 −0.6
Panel G. Education
High school graduate, no college −0.0092 −8.8 0.0000 0.0
Some college −0.0292 −17.3 −0.0010 −1.4
College graduate −0.0127 −5.6 −0.0004 −0.5
Panel H. Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) −0.0124 −4.4 −0.0016 −3.1
Mental disorders −0.0153 −7.7 −0.0016 −2.6
Mental retardation −0.0063 −1.9 −0.0008 −0.8
Nervous system 0.0158 8.6 0.0001 0.2
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 0.0040 2.3 −0.0006 −1.2
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.0036 2.4 0.0000 0.0
Respiratory system −0.0218 −10.3 −0.0006 −1.0
Injuries 0.0098 5.3 0.0009 1.9
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.0215 10.3 −0.0003 −0.5
Standard deviation of dependent variable 0.4293 0.0659
r2 0.0389 0.0002
Number of applicants = 1,779,825, number of judges = 1,497
notes: Variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned. Omitted category is male, younger than 
45, white, not represented by a lawyer, applying for SSI or SSI and DI concurrently, not a high school graduate, with 
a health condition other than those listed above. Standard errors clustered by judge.
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Our instrumental variable is the judge allowance differential,  j i   γ1,−i , demeaned 
by hearing office and day. Column 3 presents estimates from a regression of the 
judge allowance differential on covariates. Column 4 provides t-statistics. Of the 
22 covariates, two have coefficients that are statistically different than 0 at the 95 per-
cent level. Sex, age, race, previous earnings, past labor market participation, an indi-
cator equal to 1 if the individual is a DI (but not SSI) applicant, an indicator for 
whether the case is represented by a lawyer, and education all have little explanatory 
power for whether or not the case was assigned to a lenient judge. All the estimated 
coefficients are small in comparison to the coefficients on the same variables in the 
allowance equation. The only statistically significant differences are for mental dis-
orders and neoplasms. Those with mental disorders and neoplasms are assigned to 
judges who have 0.16 percent lower allowance rates than average. These coefficients 
are small, especially in comparison to the coefficients on the same variables in the 
allowance equation. The r2 shows that the covariates explain 0.02 percent of the 
variation in judge specific allowance rates. Thus, there is little evidence against the 
hypothesis of random assignment. Random assignment satisfies the independence 
assumption described in Section IIIA. The next section provides some evidence on 
whether the rank and monotonicity conditions hold.
B. First-Stage Estimates
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the number of observations for different groups of DI 
cases heard by an ALJ. Column 2 shows the allowance rate at the ALJ stage for that 
group. Column 3 shows the allowance rate of the group three years after assignment 
to an ALJ. Columns 2 and 3 show that older individuals, high earners, and those 
represented by lawyers have relatively high allowance rates.15 Nevertheless, differ-
ences in allowance rates across subgroups are small.
Column 4 shows the estimated first-stage regression coefficient   λ3 on the judge 
allowance differential from equation (4). Column 5 shows the standard error and 
column 6 the t-statistic. Column 4 shows that the probability of allowance is increas-
ing in the judge allowance differential and column 5 shows that the increase is highly 
statistically significant for all the subgroups we consider. The estimated value of   λ3 
for the full sample is 0.764, meaning that the probability that case i is allowed three 
years after assignment rises 0.764 percent for every 1 percent increase in the judge 
allowance differential (which measures the allowance rate on all cases other than 
case i ). The main reason   λ3 is less than one is because we use allowance by the ALJ 
as the measure of the judge allowance differential in Table 1, whereas we use allow-
ance three years after assignment as our key measure of allowance in Table 2. Many 
cases denied by an ALJ are later allowed.
Column 4 shows that the estimated coefficient   λ3 is larger for younger individu-
als, those with lower labor force participation and earnings prior to appealing, those 
not represented by a lawyer, and those whose primary health problem is an injury. 
15 This could be the result of lawyers representing only the most disabled claimants or lawyers causing the 
allowance probability to rise. We cannot distinguish between these two hypotheses.
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Table 2—Allowance Rates, by Demographics
Observations
Allowance 
rate 
ALJ 
stage
Allowance 
rate 
three 
years 
later
Allowance 
three 
years later 
coefficient 
on judge 
allowance 
rate SE T-ratio
Relative 
likelihooda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. All groups  
All groups 1,779,825 0.645 0.769 0.764 0.008 101 1.000
Panel B. Sex
Male 894,927 0.638 0.763 0.738 0.010 74 0.966
Female 884,898 0.652 0.774 0.791 0.009 84 1.035
Panel c. Age  
44 or younger 647,528 0.580 0.698 0.898 0.015 60 1.175
45 to 54 754,191 0.644 0.783 0.752 0.010 74 0.983
55 to 59 245,948 0.755 0.866 0.550 0.016 34 0.720
60 or older 132,158 0.762 0.848 0.612 0.023 26 0.801
Panel D. race  
White 416,177 0.673 0.791 0.742 0.008 89 0.971
Black 1,154,269 0.586 0.725 0.793 0.015 54 1.037
Other (non-black, non-white)  
 or unknown
209,379 0.608 0.733 0.835 0.019 44 1.092
Panel E. Labor force participation and income 
Average participation rate,  
 years −11 to −2 < 70%
688,194 0.581 0.696 0.914 0.013 73 1.197
Average participation rate,  
 years −11 to −2 ≥ 70%
1,091,631 0.685 0.814 0.668 0.009 72 0.874
Average earnings, years −11  
 to −2 (2006 dollars)  
  < $10,000
919,519 0.587 0.709 0.886 0.011 78 1.159
Average earnings, years −11  
 to −2 (2006 dollars)  
  ≥ $10,000
860,306 0.707 0.833 0.635 0.011 60 0.831
Panel F. represented by lawyer
Represented by lawyer 1,136,584 0.684 0.802 0.738 0.009 79 0.965
Not represented by lawyer 643,241 0.576 0.710 0.802 0.013 62 1.049
Panel G. Application type  
SSDI 673,444 0.696 0.814 0.680 0.012 57 0.890
SSI or concurrent  
 (both SSDI and SSI)
1,106,381 0.614 0.741 0.817 0.010 80 1.069
Panel H. Education  
Less than high school 726,027 0.649 0.776 0.741 0.010 75 0.969
High school graduate,  
 no college
771,339 0.647 0.767 0.778 0.010 76 1.018
Some college 197,533 0.615 0.738 0.812 0.016 51 1.062
College graduate 84,926 0.673 0.786 0.715 0.021 34 0.936
(continued)
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Abadie (2003) shows that the ratio of the group specific estimate of   λ3 relative to 
full sample estimate of   λ3 is informative for understanding the characteristics of 
those allowed by a small increase in the ALJ allowance rate. He shows that this ratio 
yields the relative likelihood that someone with a given characteristic is allowed 
given a small increase in the allowance rate. Thus, an increase in the allowance 
threshold of all judges would increase the allowance rate of those with low earnings 
and injuries more than for other groups, holding the applicant pool and the rest of 
the reapplications and appeals process constant.
An important implication of the monotonicity assumption described in 
Section IIIA is that the probability of allowance is non-decreasing in the judge 
allowance differential for all subgroups of the population. If the allowance rate was 
rising in the judge allowance differential for some subgroups of the population, 
but was declining for others, it would show that lenient judges were less likely to 
allow benefits than strict judges for some types of cases. We do not observe this 
and thus cannot reject an important implication of the monotonicity assumption. 
Furthermore, estimates are highly significant, so the rank conditions hold.
Observations
Allowance 
rate 
ALJ 
stage
Allowance 
rate 
three 
years 
later
Allowance 
three 
years later 
coefficient 
on judge 
allowance 
rate SE T-ratio
Relative 
likelihooda
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel I. Health conditions (by diagnosis group) 
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 34,436 0.644 0.762 0.698 0.036 19 0.914
Mental disorders 272,508 0.591 0.759 0.749 0.018 42 0.980
Mental retardation 31,336 0.602 0.813 0.578 0.034 17 0.756
Nervous system 99,666 0.658 0.776 0.711 0.021 34 0.931
Circulatory system  
 (e.g., heart disease) 
191,883 0.670 0.787 0.681 0.015 45 0.891
Musculoskeletal disorders  
 (e.g., back pain)
640,712 0.664 0.776 0.785 0.012 68 1.028
Respiratory system 75,079 0.632 0.760 0.757 0.025 31 0.991
Injuries 119,617 0.655 0.748 0.840 0.020 43 1.100
Endocrine system  
 (e.g., diabetes)
86,024 0.661 0.790 0.741 0.022 34 0.970
All other 228,564 0.630 0.740 0.825 0.014 58 1.079
Panel J. year assigned to judge  
1990 125,293 0.682 0.830 0.549 0.020 28 0.718
1991 145,136 0.717 0.842 0.564 0.016 36 0.739
1992 170,759 0.719 0.829 0.620 0.015 40 0.812
1993 162,315 0.687 0.792 0.736 0.018 40 0.963
1994 179,567 0.659 0.758 0.802 0.018 44 1.050
1995 197,684 0.629 0.738 0.850 0.016 54 1.113
1996 209,342 0.588 0.715 0.872 0.020 44 1.142
1997 197,951 0.589 0.723 0.852 0.017 49 1.115
1998 202,123 0.608 0.745 0.872 0.015 60 1.142
1999 184,045 0.626 0.768 0.775 0.018 43 1.014
notes: Variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned. Standard errors are clustered by judge.
a Relative likelihood is the ratio of the group specific coefficient on judge allowance rate (what is in column 4) 
to the full sample coefficient (0.764). 
Table 2—Allowance Rates, by Demographics (continued)
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C. Second Stage: The Effect of Disability recipiency on Labor Supply
Table 3 presents estimates of the effect of disability recipiency on earnings, 
labor force participation (measured as earnings > $100), and an indicator for 
 earnings > the SGA level, using both OLS and IV estimators. The first two rows 
show mean earnings, labor force participation, and mean earnings > SGA for those 
allowed and denied benefits, three years after assignment to an ALJ. Row 3 shows 
the allowance coefficient from a regression of earnings or participation on allow-
ance. Note that the coefficient on allowance is just the difference in earnings or 
participation between those allowed and those denied. The next row shows the asso-
ciated standard error. The next rows show OLS and IV estimates of demeaned (by 
hearing office and day) earnings, participation, or earnings > SGA on similarly 
demeaned allowance. The next row includes the covariates listed in Table 1: race, 
sex, age and education group dummy variables, health (disability category), aver-
age earnings and participation prior to disability, representation by an attorney, and 
an indicator of concurrent SSDI application. Parameter estimates are remarkably 
similar whether using IV or OLS, whether demeaning or not, or whether we add 
additional covariates or not.
Our preferred results are the IV estimates with no covariates. These estimates 
suggest that those who are allowed benefits earn on average $4,059 per year, are 
25.6 percent less likely to participate, and are 16.1 percent less likely to earn over 
the SGA level than their denied counterparts. Adding all the covariates listed in 
Table 1 to this specification has only a tiny effect on the estimates. For example, 
Table 3—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Labor Supply
Dependent variable: 
earnings
Dependent variable: 
participation
Dependent variable: 
earnings > SGA
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Without covariates
 Allowed 1,442 0.130 0.047
 Denied 5,345 0.395 0.211
 Coefficient on allowance −3,903 −0.265 −0.163
 (SE) (37) (0.002) (0.001)
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −3,857 −4,059 −0.262 −0.256 −0.163 −0.161 (SE) (34) (140) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005)
With covariates
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −4,247 −4,023 −0.271 −0.255 −0.169 −0.161 (SE) (65) (127) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −4,688 −0.295 −0.182
 (SE) (76) (0.002) (0.001)
Non-labor supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −3,773 −0.253 −0.158
 (SE) (34) (0.002) (0.001)
notes: n = 1,779,825. Standard errors are clustered by judge. Instrument is judge allowance differential. Earnings, 
participation, and allowance are measured three years after assignment to a judge. Earnings in 2006 dollars. 
Participation is an indicator for earnings over $100 in a year. Covariates are those in Table 1; they include race, sex, 
age, and education groups, health (disability category), average earnings and participation prior to disability, repre-
sentation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application. 
a For demeaned allowance, all variables are demeaned from the hearing office-day average. 
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adding covariates to the IV participation equation changes the estimated partici-
pation response from 25.6 percent to 25.5 percent. Recall that our IV estimation 
procedure should deliver consistent estimates, with or without covariates. Thus, it is 
reassuring to see that adding covariates barely changes the estimates.
Perhaps the most surprising fact in Table 3 is that OLS and IV estimates are so 
similar. In contrast, Chen and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, Mullin, and 
Strand (2013) find the OLS estimates are larger than IV. Our IV estimates are larger 
than those of both Chen and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, Mullin, and 
Strand (2013), although our OLS estimates are smaller. Our OLS estimates are 
likely smaller because our initial sample is the set of individuals who appealed an 
ALJ decision. These individuals potentially have weaker attachment to the labor 
force than the pool of all initial applicants, which is the sample used in those other 
two papers. However, for all three papers we are estimating labor supply responses 
for the “marginal applicant,” whose condition is severe enough that they have a good 
chance of allowance, but are not sufficiently disabled that they are guaranteed allow-
ance at the initial stage. Thus, it should not be particularly surprising that the our 
IV estimates are similar to those of Chen and van der Klauww (2008) and Maestas, 
Mullin, and Strand (2013).
Bound (1989) suggests that OLS should overstate the true work disincentive 
effect of DI, because those who are allowed are on average less healthy and thus less 
likely to work than those who are not allowed. Differences in labor supply across the 
two groups is partly due to the effect of DI, but also partly due to the fact that those 
denied benefits would be more likely to work, even if they were allowed. Consistent 
with this view, Table 2 shows that older individuals have high allowance rates. 
Tables 5 and 6 show that these individuals are unlikely to work. Moreover, only 
16.2 percent of those allowed benefits in our sample die within ten years, whereas 
12.6 percent of those denied benefits die within ten years. However, as pointed out 
by Bound (1989, 1991), Parsons (1991), and more recent research, those allowed 
benefits have stronger attachment to the labor market prior to applying for benefits. 
It is possible that this attachment extends to after when they apply for benefits. Thus, 
it is possible that those allowed benefits are more likely to work in the absence of 
benefit receipt. This would imply that OLS understates the work disincentive effect 
of DI. Consistent with this view, Table 2 shows that those allowed benefits have 
higher earnings and participation prior to applying. Thus, it is an empirical question 
whether OLS overstates or understates the effect of DI receipt on participation.
The bottom rows of Table 3 present OLS earnings and participation estimates 
with different sets of additional covariates. The table reveals two offsetting biases in 
the OLS estimates. Recall the the coefficient on allowed when including no covari-
ates is −0.265, but is potentially biased up or down. OLS potentially understates the 
effect (i.e., OLS is biased towards 0) because those allowed benefits have stronger 
prior attachment to the labor market. Thus, accounting for prior attachment to the 
labor market should increase the magnitude of the estimated effect. Consistent with 
this view, accounting for earnings and participation prior to appeal, but nothing 
else, increases the estimated effect from −0.265 to −0.295. OLS potentially over-
states the effect (i.e., OLS is biased towards −1) because those allowed benefits 
are older and less healthy. Thus, accounting for age and health condition should 
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reduce the magnitude of the effect. Consistent with this view, when we omit labor 
supply variables, but include all the other variables listed in Table 1, the estimated 
effect declines from −0.265 to −0.253. Thus, there is evidence for the two offset-
ting effects.
The results in this section are robust to a number of other modifications to sample 
selection and functional form. Table 4 provides robustness checks for the participation 
estimates, and Table B1 in Appendix B provides further results, including estimates 
when using earnings. The first row of Table 4 shows estimates from our benchmark 
model. The benchmark model estimates the effect of allowance three years after 
assignment to a judge on participation three years after assignment. It conditions on 
a full set of hearing office-day interactions, drops observations that are missing edu-
cation information, and includes those who died in the three years after assignment 
(and uses allowance status at time of death for allowance and sets participation to 0 
for these individuals). In the second row, we include the 123,911 individuals with 
missing education. When we do this the estimate for participation rises in magnitude 
from −0.256 to −0.257. The third row drops both those with missing education (as 
in the baseline case) as well as the 49,017 individuals who died within three years 
following assignment (whereas in the baseline we include those who died, and treat 
their participation as 0). When we do this the estimate for participation rises in mag-
nitude to −0.260. The fourth row drops the 47,757 cases where only one case was 
heard at the office. Given that these observations contribute no identifying variation, 
dropping these observations do not change the point estimate relative to the baseline. 
The fifth row drops the 242,908 cases where only one judge heard cases at the office 
on the day of assignment, and finds the same estimate. The sixth and seventh rows 
use the baseline sample and condition on a full set of hearing office-quarter and hear-
ing office-year interactions, respectively, rather than a full set of hearing office-day 
interactions. These modifications also have little effect on the point estimates.
Table 5 disaggregates the participation responses by demographics, earnings, and 
health conditions. Column 1 reports mean earnings for allowed individuals, col-
umn 2 for denied individuals, column 3 the difference, and column 4 the standard 
error. Column 5 reports the IV estimate of allowance on earnings and column 6 
the standard error. Table 5 shows that the effect of DI allowance on participation is 
relatively small for college graduates and those with mental disorders, but is larger 
for high school graduates and those with musculoskeletal problems and injuries. 
Participation responses are larger in the late 1990s than the early 1990s and early 
Table 4—Robustness Checks, IV Estimates
Dependent variable: participation Estimate (SE) Observations
Benchmark specification −0.256 (0.006) 1,779,825
Include those with missing education −0.257 (0.006) 1,903,736
Drop those who died within three years after assignment −0.260 (0.006) 1,730,808
Drop observations where only one case was heard at the office-day −0.256 (0.006) 1,732,068
Drop cases where only one judge heard cases at the office-day −0.256 (0.007) 1,536,917
Condition on hearing office-quarter interactionsa −0.257 (0.006) 1,779,825
Condition on hearing office-year interactionsa −0.256 (0.006) 1,779,825
a Rather than hearing office-day interactions.
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Table 5—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Participation, Disaggregated
Average
participation
rate OLS IV
Years −11 to −2 Allowed Denied Difference SE Difference SE
Panel A. All groups
All groups 0.664 0.130 0.395 −0.265 0.002 −0.256 0.006
Panel B. Sex
Male 0.702 0.133 0.403 −0.270 0.002 −0.263 0.009
Female 0.626 0.127 0.386 −0.260 0.002 −0.250 0.008
Panel c. Age
45 or younger 0.665 0.174 0.467 −0.293 0.002 −0.290 0.009
45 to 54 0.665 0.116 0.359 −0.244 0.002 −0.254 0.009
55 to 59 0.667 0.094 0.282 −0.189 0.003 −0.248 0.019
60 to 64 0.649 0.099 0.179 −0.080 0.003 −0.069 0.023
Panel D. race
Black 0.639 0.138 0.425 −0.287 0.003 −0.252 0.014
White 0.691 0.133 0.393 −0.260 0.002 −0.265 0.008
Other (non-black, non-white)  
 or unknown
0.561 0.097 0.343 −0.246 0.004 −0.221 0.016
Panel E. Labor force participation and income
Average participation rate, years  
 −11 to −2 < 70% 0.312 0.065 0.264 −0.199 0.002 −0.176 0.009
Average participation rate, years  
 −11 to −2 ≥ 70% 0.885 0.165 0.531 −0.365 0.002 −0.327 0.012
Average earnings, years −11 to −2  
 (2006 dollars) < $10,000
0.457 0.087 0.325 −0.239 0.002 −0.202 0.008
Average earnings, years −11 to −2  
 (2006 dollars) ≥ $10,000
0.885 0.169 0.525 −0.356 0.002 −0.335 0.014
Panel F. represented by lawyer
Represented by lawyer 0.703 0.130 0.400 −0.270 0.002 −0.274 0.008
Not represented by lawyer 0.595 0.129 0.389 −0.260 0.002 −0.226 0.010
Panel G. Application type
SSDI 0.813 0.175 0.429 −0.254 0.002 −0.277 0.016
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent 0.573 0.100 0.380 −0.280 0.002 −0.244 0.008
Panel H. Education
Less than high school 0.589 0.076 0.327 −0.251 0.002 −0.230 0.009
High school graduate, no college 0.707 0.148 0.425 −0.277 0.002 −0.279 0.009
Some college 0.732 0.210 0.479 −0.269 0.003 −0.261 0.019
College graduate 0.754 0.254 0.472 −0.219 0.004 −0.179 0.031
Panel I. Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 0.677 0.155 0.457 −0.302 0.006 −0.194 0.043
Mental disorders 0.619 0.146 0.383 −0.237 0.003 −0.202 0.016
Mental retardation 0.576 0.094 0.322 −0.227 0.007 −0.282 0.048
Nervous system 0.667 0.140 0.392 −0.251 0.004 −0.237 0.027
Circulatory system  
 (e.g., heart disease) 0.656 0.111 0.367 −0.256 0.003 −0.250 0.018
Musculoskeletal disorders  
 (e.g., back pain) 0.710 0.136 0.419 −0.283 0.002 −0.285 0.009
Respiratory system 0.619 0.089 0.363 −0.274 0.004 −0.254 0.023
Injuries 0.682 0.147 0.468 −0.320 0.003 −0.367 0.022
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.606 0.089 0.324 −0.235 0.004 −0.224 0.024
All other 0.630 0.128 0.365 −0.237 0.003 −0.211 0.015
(continued)
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2000s (recall that participation is measured three years after assignment, so assign-
ment in 1999 refers to participation in 2002), potentially giving evidence that the 
work disincentive from DI is larger when it is easier to get a job. For most groups, the 
OLS estimates are very close to the IV estimates. One interesting exception is those 
with neoplasms. OLS estimates suggest decline in participation of 30.2 percent in 
response to allowance, whereas IV suggests a decline of only 19.4 percent. The low 
responsiveness of labor supply of those with mental illness is particularly  surprising. 
Mental health is more difficult to monitor than many other health  conditions. As a 
result, some analysts believe that many who claim mental illness are those who are 
Average
participation
rate OLS IV
Years −11 to −2 Allowed Denied Difference SE Difference SE
Panel J. year assigned to judge
1990 0.654 0.100 0.323 −0.223 0.004 −0.234 0.023
1991 0.668 0.108 0.332 −0.224 0.004 −0.186 0.021
1992 0.661 0.115 0.362 −0.247 0.004 −0.277 0.020
1993 0.647 0.123 0.370 −0.246 0.004 −0.231 0.018
1994 0.652 0.137 0.395 −0.259 0.004 −0.293 0.015
1995 0.663 0.142 0.410 −0.268 0.003 −0.276 0.015
1996 0.666 0.141 0.431 −0.289 0.003 −0.273 0.014
1997 0.661 0.147 0.424 −0.277 0.003 −0.252 0.013
1998 0.675 0.140 0.410 −0.270 0.003 −0.265 0.014
1999 0.690 0.134 0.386 −0.252 0.003 −0.222 0.017
notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates. IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allow-
ance differential as the instrument. Allowance and participation measured three years after assignment to an ALJ. 
Standard errors clustered by judge.
Table 5—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Participation, Disaggregated (continued)
Table 6—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Earnings, Disaggregated
Average
earnings OLS IV
Years −11 to −2 Allowed Denied Difference SE Difference SE 
Panel A. All groups
All groups 15,302 1,442 5,345 −3,903 37 −4,059 140
Panel B. Sex
Male 19,410 1,731 6,231 −4,500 48 −4,695 234
Female 11,146 1,153 4,405 −3,252 36 −3,438 174
Panel c. Age
45 or younger 12,571 2,085 6,251 −4,166 46 −4,698 228
45 to 54 16,057 1,286 5,026 −3,740 45 −4,038 205
55 to 59 18,031 872 3,728 −2,855 69 −3,218 427
60 to 64 19,286 747 1,773 −1,026 59 −1,496 460
Panel D. race
Black 12,522 1,193 5,175 −3,982 48 −3,675 249
White 17,140 1,581 5,637 −4,056 44 −4,383 197
Other (non-black, non-white)  
 or unknown
10,690 1,100 4,431 −3,331 67 −3,143 381
(continued)
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healthy and would have worked in the absence of benefit allowance (Bound and 
Burkhauser 1999). This turns out not to be the case.
Table 6 disaggregates the earnings responses by demographics, earnings, and 
health conditions. Results from this table are consistent with the results in Table 4. 
Average
earnings OLS IV
Years −11 to −2 Allowed Denied Difference SE Difference SE 
Panel E. Labor force participation and income
Average participation rate, years  
 −11 to −2 < 70%
3,445 521 2,654 −2,132 24 −2,025 171
Average participation rate, years  
−11 to −2 ≥ 70%
22,776 1,937 8,124 −6,186 51 −5,847 287
Average earnings, years −11 to −2  
 (2006 dollars) < $10,000
3,440 578 3,025 −2,448 23 −2,134 165
Average earnings, years −11 to −2  
 (2006 dollars) ≥ $10,000
27,979 2,227 9,661 −7,434 66 −6,888 370
Panel F. represented by lawyer
Represented by lawyer 16,851 1,461 5,474 −4,013 41 −4,431 190
Not represented by lawyer 12,563 1,402 5,189 −3,787 47 −3,459 239
Panel G. Application type
SSDI 25,763 2,341 7,649 −5,307 70 −5,787 418
SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent  8,934 840 4,337 −3,497 34 −3,138 168
Panel H. Education
Less than high school 11,067 638 3,798 −3,160 37 −3,086 202
High school graduate, no college 16,921 1,584 5,889 −4,305 44 −4,750 207
Some college 18,571 2,577 6,953 −4,375 74 −4,077 479
College graduate 29,184 4,478 9,245 −4,767 187 −4,368 1,272
Panel I. Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 16,482 2,332 6,751 −4,420 179 −2,038 1,323
Mental disorders 12,032 1,350 4,607 −3,257 57 −2,844 318
Mental retardation  9,630 545 3,120 −2,575 107 −2,920 1,079
Nervous system 15,888 1,501 5,425 −3,924 95 −3,926 723
Circulatory system  
 (e.g., heart disease) 
17,462 1,178 4,823 −3,645 67 −3,294 385
Musculoskeletal disorders  
 (e.g., back pain)
17,319 1,619 5,974 −4,355 50 −4,942 245
Respiratory system 13,468 774 4,377 −3,603 94 −3,177 477
Injuries 15,630 2,070 7,178 −5,108 94 −6,606 578
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 12,272 741 3,727 −2,986 77 −2,589 437
All other 13,645 1,411 4,850 −3,439 59 −3,634 344
Panel J. year assigned to judge
1990 16,102 851 4,208 −3,357 93 −2,848 516
1991 16,298 1,078 4,374 −3,296 99 −3,360 650
1992 15,712 1,154 4,692 −3,538 88 −4,205 418
1993 14,523 1,213 4,460 −3,247 76 −4,017 318
1994 14,290 1,444 4,803 −3,359 67 −3,748 350
1995 14,787 1,661 5,415 −3,754 70 −4,317 357
1996 15,049 1,716 5,976 −4,260 68 −4,366 348
1997 15,112 1,773 6,016 −4,243 71 −3,766 316
1998 15,698 1,704 5,991 −4,287 71 −4,745 326
1999 16,097 1,566 5,555 −3,989 71 −4,078 367
notes: OLS estimates are in levels with no covariates. IV estimates use demeaned variables and the judge allowance 
differential as the instrument. Allowance and earnings measured three years after assignment to an ALJ. Standard 
errors clustered by judge. Earnings in 2006 dollars.
Table 6—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Earnings, Disaggregated (continued)
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For all groups, allowance reduces earnings. Earnings estimates tend to be less pre-
cise than estimates for participation, however.
D. Dynamics of the response
This section shows the dynamics of the response of both earnings and labor force 
participation. Figure 3 shows the earnings and participation responses to benefit 
allowance. Panel A shows annual earnings for those who are allowed and those 
who are denied DI benefits by an ALJ both before and after the date of assignment 
to a judge. Prior to assignment, those who are allowed benefits have higher earn-
ings than their denied counterparts. By the year of assignment, earnings for allowed 
and denied individuals are similar. Three years after assignment, earnings of those 
allowed benefits average $1,490 while earnings of those denied average $3,842, 
a difference of $2,352. Differences in earnings between those allowed and those 
denied emerge rapidly, are very stable two–five years after assignment, and decline 
slowly thereafter.16
Consistent with the evidence on earnings, panel C of Figure 3 shows that ten 
years prior to assignment, those who are subsequently allowed benefits have par-
ticipation rates that are 7 percentage points higher than those subsequently denied 
16 Some care must be taken in interpreting the decline in earnings of denied individuals 5 years after assignment 
because, after 5 years, 7 percent of all sample members are at least 65; after 10 years, 21 percent are at least 65. 
These people are eligible for full Social Security benefits, even if they were initially denied.
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Figure 3. Dynamics of Earnings and Participation, Allowed versus Denied by ALJ
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 benefits. Three years after the date of assignment, those who are allowed bene-
fits have participation rates that are 17 percentage points lower than those who are 
denied. Afterwards, the differences between the two groups narrow slightly.
Panels B and D show IV estimates of earnings and labor force participation of 
allowed and denied individuals both before and after assignment to a judge. We 
estimate the effect of allowance for each year relative to the assignment year, as pre-
dicted by the judge allowance differential. Using the estimation procedure described 
in Section IIIB, we can estimate the effect of DI receipt on earnings or participation 
at any point in time (at least for those affected by the instrument). The vertical differ-
ence between the allowed and denied lines is this estimated effect. In order to make 
the figures more concrete, we also present the level of earnings and participation. To 
identify the level, we make the additional assumption that E[ ϕ i τ ] for those affected 
by the instrument is the same as E[ ϕ i τ ] for those not affected by the instrument: see 
Appendix D for details. This assumption is untestable, although Section VF gives 
evidence that E[ ϕ i ] does not vary much over the support of our data.17
IV estimates for those allowed versus denied are virtually identical prior to 
assignment. Recall that the difference in participation between the two groups is 
that predicted by the instrument of the judge allowance differential. A difference of 
0 prior to assignment is a reassuring result, as it shows that we are unable to predict 
labor supply prior to assignment using our instrument. This is an important testable 
implication of the independence assumption.
However, after assignment, earnings and participation of allowed individuals are 
lower. Panel B shows that three years after the time of assignment, the difference in 
earnings between the two groups is $2,314 (virtually identical to the OLS estimate) 
and remains very stable thereafter. Similarly, panel D shows that three years after 
assignment the difference in participation between the two groups is 14.8 percent, 
and does not change much thereafter. The standard errors are tiny and thus omitted. 
For example, the standard error on the effect of allowance on participation averages 
less than 1 percent when using either OLS or IV.
Note that the IV estimate of the effect of allowance on earnings three years after 
allowance is smaller in Figure 3 ($2,314) than in Table 3 ($4,059). The difference 
arises because Figure 3 uses allowance by the ALJ, whereas Table 3 uses allow-
ance three years after assignment to the ALJ. Section VE discusses the difference 
between allowance by an ALJ and allowance at any point in time.
E. Appeals, reapplications, and Subsequent Allowance
Panel A of Figure 4 shows the share of denied (at the ALJ stage) individuals 
who are reapplying/appealing and allowed relative to when they are assigned to a 
judge.18 It shows that 35 percent of all applicants denied by an ALJ were allowed 
17 In contrast to our findings, Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2013) do find variability in E[ ϕ i τ ] across the support 
of their data.
18 We use data from ACAPS and LOTS to identify denied applicants who successfully appealed at either the 
Appeals Council or the Federal Court level. We use data from SSA 831 files, MBR (Master Beneficiary Record), 
and SSR (Supplemental Security Record) to identify denied applicants who reapplied for benefits and were allowed 
at either the DDS, reconsideration, ALJ, appeals, or federal court level stage.
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benefits within three years. Furthermore, many initially denied individuals con-
tinue to reapply or appeal for many years after their initial denial. Three years after 
assignment to an ALJ, 40 percent of all individuals denied benefits are still in the 
process of appealing or reapplying for benefits. Combined, fully 75 percent of those 
denied by an ALJ are either allowed or in the process of appealing three years after 
assignment to an ALJ.
Panel B of Figure 4 presents the share of initially denied individuals who are 
allowed benefits or are still in the process of reapplying/appealing relative to when 
they are assigned to a judge, where the shares are instrumented using the judge 
allowance differential. To do this we estimate the effect of predicted ALJ allow-
ance on allowance and appeals at future points in time, as well as the procedure in 
Appendix D to infer the effect of ALJ denial on future allowance.19 Thus, panel A 
uses OLS and panel B uses IV, where initial denial is instrumented using the judge 
allowance differential. Those affected by the instrument are likely the marginal 
cases who have a better chance of final allowance than others denied benefits. For 
this reason we might think that subsequent allowance rates of those initially denied 
19 Using the full sample, we regress demeaned allowance on a set of wave dummies and predicted demeaned 
ALJ allowance × wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance differential). The esti-
mated coefficient on allowance × wave measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on 
initial denial. Next, we regress demeaned appeal on a set of wave dummies and predicted demeaned ALJ allowance 
interacted with wave dummies (where allowance is predicted using the judge allowance differential). The estimated 
coefficient on allowance × wave measures increased probability of allowance at a given wave conditional on initial 
denial. Panel B of Figure 4 plots the coefficient on predicted allowance × wave for both the allowance and appeal 
equations.
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would be higher when instrumented. In fact, this is the case, although the OLS esti-
mates and the IV estimates are similar. For example, panel B of Figure 4 shows that 
for those initially denied benefits, the IV estimate of allowance is 42 percent three 
years after assignment, versus 35 percent from the OLS estimates.
Sections VD and VE show that most denied applicants do not work, but engage 
in reapplications and appeals until they get DI benefits. This has an important effect 
on our main estimated effects. Table 3 shows that DI benefit allowance reduces 
earnings $4,059 per year when measuring earnings and allowance three years after 
assignment to an ALJ. However, DI benefit allowance reduces earnings $4,915 per 
year when measuring earnings and allowance five years after assignment to an ALJ.
F. Estimates of the Distribution of Labor Supply, Allowance,  
and Appeal responses: marginal Treatment Effects
Using the the marginal treatment effects approach described in Section IIIC and 
Appendix C, this section shows how DI benefit allowance affects the distribution of 
labor supply, subsequent allowance, and appeals.
Panel A of Figure 5 shows the earnings decline and panel B shows the participa-
tion decline of the marginal case when allowed (i.e., the Marginal Treatment Effect). 
We use third order polynomials for both the instrument and the endogenous variable 
(demeaned allowance) when estimating equations (7) and (8). Both Akaike’s infor-
mation criterion and the Bayesian information criterion reject quadratic and quartic 
Figure 5. Earnings and Participation Decline when Allowed for Marginal Applicant
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specifications in favor of the cubic. Furthermore, results from the quartic specifica-
tion are very similar to the cubic specification. Since polynomial smoothers have 
poor endpoint properties, we show estimated MTEs over the middle 90 percent of 
the distribution of the judge allowance differential. Based upon Monte Carlo experi-
ments, we found our procedure produced little bias over the middle 90 percent of 
the distribution. Figure 5 also shows bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals.
On average, annual earnings and participation decline $4,300 and 26 percent in 
response to benefit allowance, similar to the main estimates reported in Table 3. 
However, there is heterogeneity in the declines. The earnings decline is $3,451 
for the marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is stricter than 95 percent of all 
judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are 9 percentage points below 
the average three years after assignment. The earnings decline is $4,131 for the 
marginal applicant heard by an ALJ who is more lenient than 95 percent of all 
judges, whose decisions lead to allowance rates that are 8 percentage points above 
the average three years after assignment. When judge specific allowance rates rise, 
the labor supply response of the marginal case also rises. This result is consistent 
with the notion that as allowance rates rise, more healthy individuals are allowed 
benefits. These healthier individuals are more likely to work when not receiving DI 
benefits and, thus, their labor supply response to DI receipt is greater. Nevertheless, 
the differences in the earnings response are not statistically significant and is mod-
est in size.
Figure 6 shows how allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ affects 
allowance ten years afterwards. It shows that 40 percent of those not allowed three 
years after assignment were allowed benefits ten years after assignment. For mar-
ginal applicants assigned to lenient judges and are not allowed three years after 
assignment, the probability of allowance ten years after assignment is 0.38. For 
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those assigned to strict ones it is 0.42. Recall that marginal applicants assigned to 
lenient judges and not allowed benefits are healthier than those assigned to strict 
judges. Thus, it is unsurprising that they are less likely to be allowed benefits in the 
future. What is remarkable, however, is that conditional on being denied three years 
after assignment, 40 percent have been allowed benefits ten years after assignment.
G. Elasticity of Labor Supply with respect to the After-Tax Wage
In this section we present estimates of the effect of DI on the after-tax (and after 
DI benefit) wage, as well as the earnings and participation elasticity with respect to 
the after-tax wage three years after assignment to an ALJ. Table 7 shows participa-
tion and earnings elasticities with respect to the after-tax wage, which we calculate 
as follows,
(10)   ε y, w =  (E [  y i |  A i  =  0] − E [  y i |  A i  =  1])/(E [  y i |  A i  =  0] + E [  y i |  A i  =  1])      _____(E [ w i |  A i  =  0] − E [ w i |  A i  =  1])/(E [ w i |  A i  =  0] + E [ w i |  A i  =  1])  ,
where E[  y i |  A i = 0] is the average outcome variable (either mean earnings or par-
ticipation) of denied individuals and E[ y i |  A i = 1] is the average outcome variable 
for allowed individuals. E[ w i |  A i = 0] is the average after-tax wage for denied indi-
viduals and E[ w i |  A i = 1] is the average after-tax wage for allowed individuals. The 
after-tax wage is defined as the income gain from wage earnings plus SSI and DI 
benefits (net of federal, state, and payroll taxes) when working. Appendix B pres-
ents the details of how we estimate after-tax wages.
We first predict the distribution of pretax wages for everyone in the sample using 
data on pretax wages for those working three years after assignment to an ALJ. 
The first row of Table 7 shows that the average predicted pretax wage of workers 
in our sample is $11,047. Next, we use Social Security earnings histories, the year, 
and state of residence to calculate DI/SSI benefits for everyone in the sample. The 
second row shows that the average DI/SSI benefit is $9,525. The third row shows 
Table 7—Earnings and Participation Elasticities
Allowed
versus
denied
percent
change/100
elasticity
Means
Allowed Denied
Working Not working Working Not working Elasticity
Pretax wage income 11,047 0 11,047 0 
DI/SSI benefit if allowed  9,525 9,525 0 0
DI/SSI benefit reduction  4,572 0 0 0
Taxes  2,081 0  2,081 
After-tax incomea 13,915 9,525  8,966 0 
After-tax wageb  4,390  8,966 0.64
Earnings  1,412  5,471 1.19 1.86
Participation 0.135 0.391 0.98 1.53
note: Earnings and participation estimates are from Table 3, and represented in 2006 dollars. 
a After-tax income is sum of pretax wage income and DI/SSI benefit, less DI/SSI benefit reduction and taxes.
b After-tax wage = after-tax income if working − after-tax income if not working.
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the DI/SSI benefit reduction resulting from high earnings. People who are allowed 
benefits will lose most of their benefits if they work. The fourth column shows that 
the average Federal, State, and payroll tax paid by those working is $2,081. The fifth 
row is after-tax income, which is labor income plus the DI/SSI benefit, less DI/
SSI reductions and taxes. The sixth row shows the average after-tax wage, defined 
as the difference between the after-tax income if working and the after-tax income 
if not working. The after-tax wage is $8,966 on average for those who are denied 
benefits and is $4,390 for those allowed benefits. Because most DI beneficiaries who 
are working earn above the SGA level, most people who are allowed benefits will 
lose their DI benefit if they work. Thus, most of the gain from working is lost when 
the individual has been allowed DI benefits. We take estimates of earnings and par-
ticipation declines when allowed (i.e., E[  y i |  A i = 0] − E[  y i |  A i = 1]) from Table 3 
and use the procedure in Section D to infer E[  y i |  A i = 1] and E[  y i |  A i = 0]. Table 7 
shows that the implied earnings elasticity is 1.9 and participation elasticity is 1.5. 
While our estimates suggest that most DI/SSI applicants would not work even if 
denied benefits, labor supply is elastic for this group of individuals.
In order to infer a labor supply elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage from 
the labor supply response to DI allowance, we make two strong assumptions. First, 
we assume that individuals are only responding to current work incentives and not 
future incentives. However, individuals must keep their earnings below the SGA 
level in order to appeal or reapply for benefits. Therefore, the low earnings level of 
denied applicants may be caused by the incentives to keep earnings low in order to 
appeal or to reapply for benefits. Thus, we are overstating the percent difference in 
the present value of future after-tax wages and understating the labor supply elastic-
ity. To better assess this issue, we measure the labor supply response to allowance 
five years after allowance. Figures 1 and 3 show that after five years most DI/SSI 
applicants have either received benefits or have given up on the application process. 
Five years after assignment to an ALJ, the participation elasticity is 1.6, slightly 
higher than the elasticity three years after assignment.
Second, we omit the value of health insurance benefits from both work and from 
DI/SSI receipt. When individuals lose their DI and SSI benefits due to high earn-
ings, they sometimes lose their Medicare and Medicaid health insurance benefits.20 
Thus, the percent change in the after-tax wage is likely larger and the true labor 
supply elasticity is smaller than what we report in Table 7. As such, our two strong 
assumptions lead to two potentially important, but offsetting, biases. Interestingly, 
our estimates are similar to those of KostØl and Mogstad (2012). They exploit a 
Norwegian reform whereby DI recipients would be allowed to retain more of their 
earnings if they returned to work. While KostØl and Mogstad’s (2012) approach is 
different than ours, the similarity of results reinforces the view that labor supply of 
DI applicants is elastic.
20 The rules determining health insurance eligibility are complex. Since the 1999 Ticket to Work and Work 
Incentives Improvement Act, Medicare continues for many years after benefits are first suspended for work. The 
SSI 1619(b) work incentive allows SSI recipients to maintain SSI and Medicaid eligibility when their earnings 
are well above the point where SSI benefits are zero. Most states now have Medicaid buy-in programs that allow 
individuals who work despite disabilities that meet DI/SSI medical criteria to pay a sliding scale premium for 
Medicaid benefits.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper estimates the effect of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. 
Using instrumental variables procedures, we address the fact that those allowed 
benefits are a selected sample. We find that benefit receipt reduces labor force 
 participation by 26 percentage points three years after a disability determination 
decision, although the reduction is smaller for those over age 55, college graduates, 
and those with mental illness. OLS estimates are similar to instrumental variables 
estimates. The participation elasticity with respect to the after-tax wage is 1.5. Over 
60 percent of those denied benefits are allowed benefits within ten years, showing 
that most applicants apply, reapply, and appeal until they get benefits.
Our findings have important policy implications. First, we find that a significant 
minority of DI applicants can work. Since the current disability rules strongly dis-
courage work, policy proposals to encourage the disabled to work (both through 
smaller work disincentives and through better services and support) should receive 
greater attention. Second, we find that the work disincentive effects vary with socio-
economic characteristics and types of impairments. In order to allow  pro-work 
reforms to be fully effective, these reforms must consider the heterogeneity of dis-
ability beneficiaries, and replace the “one-size-fits-all” policy with an “individu-
alized” program that targets a subgroup of beneficiaries. For example, younger 
applicants have larger labor supply responses than older applicants. Thus, programs 
focusing on getting relatively young beneficiaries back to work are likely to be more 
successful than programs focusing on getting older beneficiaries back to work.
Appendix A: Data Appendix
We use the universe of all DI appeals heard by ALJs, 1990–1999. We use data from 
the Office of Hearings and Appeals Case Control System (OHACCS), the Hearing 
Office Tracking System (HOTS), the Appeals Council Automated Processing 
System (ACAPS), the Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS), the SSA 831 
file, SSA Master Earnings File (MEF), the Master Beneficiary Record (MBR), 
the Supplemental Security Record (SSR), and the SSA Numerical Identification 
(NUMIDENT) file.
The OHACCS data contain details of Social Security DI and SSI cases adjudicated 
at the ALJ level (and also contain limited information on cases heard at the Appeals 
Council, Federal, or Supreme Court). In addition to SSI and DI, they include cases 
involving Retirement and Survivors Insurance as well as Medicare Hospital insurance. 
We keep only the SSI and DI cases. The OHACCS data are used for administering DI 
and SSI cases, and are thus very accurate. The OHACCS data include information on 
the judge assigned to the case, the hearing office, the date of assignment, and the out-
come of the case (such as allowed or denied). It also has data on the claimant’s Social 
Security number, and type of claim (DI versus SSI). The data include all cases filed 
in 1982 to present. Because our earnings data go back to 1980, and we use earnings 
data ten years prior to assignment, we use OHACCS data 1990–2009.
Until 2004, individual hearing offices maintained their own data, called the 
Hearing Office Tracking System (HOTS). These data were then uploaded to the 
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OHACCS system. We found some missing cases in the OHACCS system. These 
are apparently the result of HOTS data not being properly uploaded. The problem 
occurs in about 1 percent of all cases. For these cases we augment the OHACCS 
data with HOTS. After 2004, all uploading of data is automatic, and thus there are 
no problems with missing data.
OHACCS also contains Appeals Council records. However, data on Appeals 
Council decisions are sometimes missing from OHACCS. Thus, we use the Appeals 
Council Automated Processing System (ACAPS) data to track actions on cases 
heard at the Appeals Council level. ACAPS is the Appeals Council’s data for admin-
istration of cases.
The Litigation Overview Tracking System (LOTS) data are used for administration 
of cases that are heard at the Federal or Supreme Court level. These data provide infor-
mation on which cases that were denied at the Appeals Council level were appealed 
at the Federal Court level. We combine the LOTS data with information provided by 
the Federal Court to determine whether the cases was eventually allowed or denied.
The SSA 831 data have information on the details of the DI application received 
at the Disability Determination Service. The data include information on the type 
of application (whether DI or SSI or concurrent) and whether the claim is on one’s 
own earnings history or on the history of a spouse or parent. It also has all the infor-
mation relevant for determining whether the application should be allowed, either 
through a medical listing or the vocational grid. Thus, we have detailed medical 
information, such as the health condition of the individual. Because of the voca-
tional grid, we have information on age, education, industry, and occupation. We 
also have some other demographic information such as sex. Since a new 831 record 
is established whenever a new application is filed and adjudicated, we use informa-
tion in the 831 file to identify those who reapplied for benefits.
The Master Earnings File (MEF) includes annual longitudinal earnings data for 
the US population. It includes not only individuals’ annual Social Security covered 
earnings from 1951 to the present (which we use to calculate the Primary Insurance 
Amount for DI benefits), but also individuals’ annual wages directly taken from 
the W-2 starting from 1978. We use data back to 1981. Wage earnings are not top-
coded, but self-employment earnings are top-coded until 1992. Our earnings mea-
sure is the sum of wage earnings and self-employment earnings, which we topcode 
at $200,000 per year.
The Master Beneficiary Record (MBR) includes beneficiary and payment his-
tory data for OASDI program. The Supplemental Security Record (SSR) contains 
information on individuals applying for SSI benefits. We use the MBR and SSR to 
identify disability benefit award status of individuals.
Lastly, we use the SSA NUMIDENT for information on date of death. The 
NUMIDENT file includes information from the Social Security Number application 
form such as name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Once the individual 
dies, the date of death is placed on the file. We treat individuals who die as missing, 
although we found that this assumption does not affect our results.
For Figure 1 and A1 we use all cases filed 1989–1999. We include all primary dis-
ability—auxiliary benefit claimants (i.e., child and spouse) are excluded. We make 
no other sample restrictions for these cases. For all other figures and tables, we begin 
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with the universe of all cases adjudicated by an ALJ and make the following sample 
restrictions, described in Table A1:
 (i) We drop all Medicare cases. These Medicare cases are typically disputes over 
whether Medicare will pay for certain medical treatments.
 (ii) We drop all remand cases (cases sent to Appeals Council, then sent back to 
the hearing office). We drop these because this would lead to double counting 
of cases, as a remand is a case that was already heard by an ALJ.
 (iii) We drop cases with a missing Social Security number. This leaves us with 
3,525,787 cases for 1990–1999.
 (iv) We drop all cases younger than 35 or older than 64.
 (v) We drop cases with missing judge or hearing office information.
 (vi) We drop cases that were previewed prior to being assigned to a judge. These 
cases are extremely likely to be critical cases that are reviewed by a senior 
attorney.
 (vii) We drop cases where the claim is against the earnings record of a spouse or 
parent.
 (viii) We drop cases with missing education data. This leaves us with 1,779,825 
cases.
Table A2 presents sample means.
reapplications and Appeals.—Figure A1 uses the same data as in Figure 1, which 
shows the total share of initial claims allowed at any level. It also  disaggregates 
Table A1—Sample Selection
Sample size
Original sample 3,525,787
Number of drops
 (1): Age at assignment < 35 or > 64 792,939
 (2): Missing judge or hearing office information 174
 (3): Case is previewed 794,470
 (4): DI child case 30,221
 (5): Survivor case 3,564
 (6): Missing education data 123,911
 (7): Judge handled fewer than 50 cases 683
Total number of sample dropped (sum of drops 1–7) 1,745,962
Remaining sample 1,779,825
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Table A2—Means
Panel A. Sex
Female 0.497
Panel B. Age
45 or younger 0.364
45 to 54 0.424
55 to 59 0.138
60 to 64 0.074
Panel c. race 
Black 0.234
Other (non-black, non-white) or unknown 0.118
Panel D. Labor force participation and income
Average participation rate, years −11 to −2 ≥ 70% 0.922
Average earnings, years −11 to −2 (2006 dollars) ≥ $10,000 0.483
Not represented by lawyer 0.639
SSDI (not SSI or SSI/SSDI concurrent) 0.378
Panel E. Education
Less than high school 0.408
High school graduate, no college 0.433
Some college 0.111
College graduate 0.048
Panel F. Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) 0.128
Mental disorders 0.019
Mental retardation 0.153
Nervous system 0.018
Circulatory system (e.g., heart disease) 0.056
(continued)
Figure A1. Share of All DI/SSI Applicants Who Are Allowed Benefits,  
Are Applying/Appealing, and Share Who Are Denied, No Longer Reapplying, or Appealing
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those cases not allowed into those where the application process ended versus those 
who were reapplying or appealing a denial. Ten years after the initial filing, 67 per-
cent of all claimants were allowed benefits, 27 percent were denied and the process 
ended, and 6 percent were still in the process of applying for benefits. Together, 
Figures 1 and A1 emphasize the fact that reapplications and appeals are important 
for understanding the DI system.
Appendix B: Additional Results
conditioning on Hearing Office and Quarter or year Instead of Day.—In this 
Appendix we show additional results, conditioning on hearing office and quarter, 
then hearing office and year, rather than hearing office and day. As we pointed out 
earlier, conditioning on hearing office and day means that we must include many 
additional covariates. Conditioning on hearing office and quarter or hearing office 
and year are more parsimonious specifications. Table B1 shows evidence on the 
extent to which we can predict the judge allowance differential when conditioning 
on hearing office and day, hearing office and quarter, and hearing office and year. As 
such, it generalizes Table 1 of the paper. It shows that there is more evidence against 
random assignment when conditioning on hearing office and year than hearing office 
and day, although estimates are similar whether using hearing office and day, or 
hearing office and quarter, or hearing office and year. For example, the  t-statistic for 
the coefficient on injuries is 1.9 when conditioning on hearing office × day interac-
tions, but is 2.3 when conditioning on hearing office quarter, and 2.4 when condi-
tioning on hearing office × year. For this reason, we condition on hearing office and 
day for the main analysis, but show estimates when conditioning on hearing office 
and quarter and hearing office and year in this Appendix.
Musculoskeletal disorders (e.g., back pain) 0.108
Respiratory system 0.360
Injuries 0.042
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) 0.067
All other 0.048
Panel G. year assigned to judge 
1990 0.070
1991 0.082
1992 0.096
1993 0.091
1994 0.101
1995 0.111
1996 0.118
1997 0.112
1998 0.114
1999 0.104
Allowance by ALJ 0.645
Allowance three years after assignment to an ALJ 0.769
Participation three years after assignment to an ALJ 0.191
Earnings three years after assignment to an ALJ 2,345
Observations = 1,779,825
Table A2—Means (continued)
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Next, we show our main estimates, conditioning on both hearing office and quar-
ter and also hearing office and year. We focus on participation and earnings. Panel A 
of Table B2 shows results when conditioning on hearing office × day interactions, 
and is the same specification as Table 3 of the main text. Panel B shows results when 
conditioning on hearing office × quarter interactions, and panel C shows results 
when conditioning on hearing office × year interactions. Comparing the three 
Table B1—Predictors of Judge Allowance Differential, Conditional on Day, Quarter, and Year
Judge allowance differential 
(demeaned by hearing
office and day)
Judge allowance differential 
(demeaned by hearing
office and quarter)
Judge allowance differential 
(demeaned by hearing
office and year)
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Sex
Female 0.0002 0.9 0.0002 0.8 0.0002 0.8
Panel B. Age
45 to 54 −0.0003 −1.3 −0.0003 −1.4 −0.0003 −1.3
55 to 59 −0.0005 −1.0 −0.0003 −0.6 −0.0004 −0.7
60 or older −0.0004 −0.6 −0.0003 −0.4 −0.0003 −0.4
Panel c. race
Black 0.0001 0.1 −0.0001 −0.1 −0.0001 −0.1
Other (non-black, non-white)
 or unknown
−0.0001 0.0 −0.0003 −0.1 −0.0003 −0.2
Panel D. Labor force participation and income
Average participation rate, years
 −11 to −2
0.0000 0.1 0.0000 0.2 0.0000 0.2
Average earnings/1,000,000, years
 −11 to −2 (2006 dollars)
−0.0002 0.0 −0.0044 −0.4 −0.0057 −0.5
Panel E. represented by lawyer
Represented by lawyer 0.0008 1.0 0.0010 1.1 0.0010 1.0
Panel F. Application type
SSDI −0.0004 −0.6 −0.0003 −0.3 −0.0003 −0.3
Panel G. Education
High school graduate, no college 0.0000 0.0 0.0000 −0.1 −0.0001 −0.1
Some college −0.0010 −1.4 −0.0010 −1.3 −0.0011 −1.3
College graduate −0.0004 −0.5 −0.0006 −0.7 −0.0006 −0.7
Panel H. Health conditions (by diagnosis group)
Neoplasms (e.g., cancer) −0.0016 −3.1 −0.0021 −3.7 −0.0021 −3.6
Mental disorders −0.0016 −2.6 −0.0019 −2.9 −0.0020 −2.9
Mental retardation −0.0008 −0.8 −0.0006 −0.5 −0.0006 −0.5
Nervous system 0.0001 0.2 −0.0002 −0.4 −0.0002 −0.4
Circulatory system
 (e.g., heart disease) 
−0.0006 −1.2 −0.0007 −1.2 −0.0007 −1.2
Musculoskeletal disorders
 (e.g., back pain)
0.0000 0.0 0.0001 0.2 0.0001 0.2
Respiratory system −0.0006 −1.0 −0.0006 −0.9 −0.0006 −0.9
Injuries 0.0009 1.9 0.0012 2.3 0.0013 2.4
Endocrine system (e.g., diabetes) −0.0003 −0.5 −0.0002 −0.5 −0.0003 −0.5
Standard deviation of
 dependent variable
0.0659 0.0633 0.0653
 r 2 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
Number of applicants = 1,779,825, number of judges = 1,497
notes: Variables allowed and judge allowance differential are demeaned. Standard errors are clustered by judge. 
Omitted category is male, younger than 45, white, not represented by a lawyer, applying for SSI or SSI and DI con-
currently, not a high school graduate, with a health condition other than those listed above.
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Table B2—Estimated Effect of DI Recipiency on Labor Supply
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
Earnings Participation
OLS IV OLS IV
Panel A. conditioning on hearing office-day interactions
Without covariates:
 Coefficient on allowance −3,903 −0.265
 (SE) (37) (0.002)
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −3,857 −4,059 −0.262 −0.256
 (SE) (34) (140) (0.002) (0.006)
With covariates:
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −4,247 −4,023 −0.271 −0.255
 (SE) (65) (127) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −4,688 −0.295
 (SE) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −3,773 −0.253
 (SE) (34) (0.002)
Panel B. conditioning on hearing office-quarter interactions
Without covariates:
 Coefficient on allowance −3,903 −0.265
 (SE) (37) (0.002)
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −3,837 −4,113 −0.261 −0.257
 (SE) (34) (126) (0.002) (0.006)
With covariates:
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −4,229 −4,028 −0.270 −0.255
 (SE) (64) (116) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −4,688 −0.295
 (SE) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −3,773 −0.253
 (SE) (34) (0.002)
Panel c. conditioning on hearing office-year interactions
Without covariates:
 Coefficient on allowance −3,903 −0.265
 (SE) (37) (0.002)
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −3,833 −4,104 −0.261 −0.256
 (SE) (34) (128) (0.002) (0.006)
With covariates:
 Coefficient on demeaned allowancea −4,223 −4,002 −0.270 −0.254
 (SE) (64) (119) (0.002) (0.005)
Lagged labor supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −4,688 −0.295
 (SE) (76) (0.002)
Non-labor-supply covariates only
 Coefficient on allowance −3,773 −0.253
 (SE) (34) (0.002)
notes: Observations = 1,779,825. Standard errors are clustered by judge. Instrument is judge allowance differen-
tial. Earnings, participation, and allowance are measured 3 years after assignment to a judge. Earnings in 2006 dol-
lars. Participation is an indicator for earnings over $100 in a year. Covariates are those in Table 1; they include race, 
sex, age and education groups, health (disability category), average earnings and participation prior to disability, 
representation by an attorney, and an indicator of concurrent SSDI application.
a For demeaned allowance, all variables are demeaned from the hearing office-day, quarter or year average.
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 panels shows that conditioning on hearing office ×  quarter or hearing office × year 
instead of hearing office × day has little effect on the estimates.
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Figure B1. Dynamics of Earnings and Participation, Allowed versus Denied by ALJ
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Disaggregation by Age Groups.—In Tables 5 and 6 of the paper we estimated 
effects for different age groupings. Figures B1 and C1 show the underlying labor 
supply, appeal allowance outcomes for those both ages 40–44 and also 50–54. 
Panel A of Figure B1 shows estimated earnings and participation responses to 
allowance by an ALJ, both using OLS and IV, for those ages 40–44. Panel B shows 
the same responses for those ages 50–54. Figure B1 shows that, prior to assignment, 
the two age groups have similar participation rates, although those aged 50–54 have 
somewhat higher earnings. Following assignment, those denied benefits are much 
more likely to return to work if they are in the 40–44 year old age group: 36 per-
cent are working three years after assignment versus only 24 percent among those 
ages 50–54. The IV estimates are similar to the OLS estimates. Figure C1 shows 
that part of the reason that younger individuals are more likely to return to work is 
that they are less likely to be allowed benefits: three years after assignment 29 per-
cent of those aged 40–44 at time of assignment were allowed, versus 42 percent for 
those ages 50–54 were allowed. Figure C1 also shows that among those ages 40–44, 
15 percent are still appealing or reapplying for benefits ten years after assignment, 
and 54 percent have been allowed benefits.
Appendix C: Derivations
marginal Treatment Effects.—All derivations in this are purely for complete-
ness—they are straightforward adaptations of those discussed in Heckman, Urzua, 
and Vytlacil (2006) or French and Taber (2011). Define  A i as a 0–1 indicator = 1 if 
individual i is allowed benefits,  y i is earnings, participation, appeals, or future allow-
ance. We drop t subscripts for simplicity. Individual i’s earnings are characterized by
(11)  y i = {  y 1i if  A i = 1 , y 0i if  A i = 0
where
(12)   y 1i = ϕ +  X i  δ y +  u 1i ,
   y 0i =  X i  δ y +  u i .
Combining equations (11) and (12) yields
(13)   y i =  A i  ϕ i +  X i  δ y +  u i ,
where  ϕ i = ϕ +  u 1i −  u i . Allowance is determined by
(14)   A i = 1 { g ( Z i ) −  V i > 0} ,
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Panel B. Ages 50−54: probability of allowance or appeal/reapplication, conditional on denial by ALJ
Figure C1. Allowance and Appeals/Reapplications Following Denial by ALJ, Ages 40–44 and 50–54
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where 1{·} is the indicator function,  Z i = (  j i ,  X i ), and  j i represents a full set of 
judge dummy variables. By assumption,  u i and  ϕ i are potentially correlated with 
each other, but  V i is independent of  j i and  X i . The Marginal Treatment Effect is
(15)  mTE ( X i = x,  V i = p) ≡ E [  y 1i −  y 0i |  X i = x,  V i = p],
where P( Z i ) ≡ Pr( A i = 1| Z i ). Given equation (12), mTE( X i = x,  V i = p) = ϕ + 
u 1i −  u 0i =  ϕ i . Using equation (13), we estimate the conditional expectation 
function
(16) E [  y i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] = E[ A i  ϕ i +  X i  δ y +  u i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p]
  = E[ A i (ϕ +  u 1i −  u i ) |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p]
   +  X i  δ y + E[ u i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p]
  = E[ A i ϕ |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p]
   + E[( u 1i −  u i ) |  A i = 1,  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] p
   +  X i  δ A + E[ u i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p],
where the step E[ A i ( u 1i −  u i ) |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] = E[( u 1i −  u i ) |  A i = 1,  X i = x, 
P( Z i ) = p]Pr[ A i = 1 |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] follows from the Law of Total Probability, 
and noting that Pr[ A i = 1 |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] = p. Continuing with the simplifica-
tions, and noting that we have already assumed that  u 1i ,  u i are independent of  X i , 
we have
(17) E [  y i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p] = ϕp + E[( u 1i −  u i ) |  A i = 1, P( Z i ) = p]
  +  X i  δ A + E[ u i | P( Z i ) = p]
  =  X i  δ A + ϕp 
 + E [( u 1i −  u i ) |  A i = 1, P( Z i ) = p] p
 + E [ u i | P( Z i ) = p]
  =  X i  δ A + K( p),
where K( p) ≡ ϕp + E[( u 1i −  u i ) |  A i = 1, P( Z i ) = p]p + E[ u i | P( Z i ) = p]. 
Differentiating equation (17) with respect to p yields
(18)   ∂E[  y i |  X i = x, P( Z i ) = p]   __ ∂ p  =  K′ ( p).
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This derivative is equal to the Marginal Treatment Effect. To see this, note that as a 
normalization we can let the distribution of  V i be uniform [0, 1], so
(19)  ∂ E [  y i |  X i = x, P ( Z i ) = p]   __ ∂ p  
   =  ∂  [ ∫ 0 p E [  y 1i |  X i = x,  V i = p] +  ∫ p 1 E [  y 0i |  X i = x,  V i = p] ]       _____∂ p  
  = E [ y 1i |  X i = x,  V i = p] − E [  y 0i |  X i = x,  V i = p]
  ≡ mTE ( X i = x,  V i = p).
Thus, estimation of equation (17) and taking  K′ ( p) yields the MTE. In the text, we 
refer to P( Z i ) as the plim of   Ai .
Demeaning the Data.—We have 217,663 hearing office-day interactions as 
covariates, so directly estimating equations (1) and (2) is not computationally fea-
sible. To simplify the problem we demean the data. Specifically, we take the dif-
ference between  A it , and  y i and the means of the same variables heard at the same 
hearing office and same day.21 For example, when estimating the MTE we estimate 
equations (20) and (21):
(20)   ˜  A it =  ∑ 
k=1
K
  λ kt ( ˜  ji    γ1, −i ) k +  η it ,
(21)   ˜  yi τ =  ∑ 
k=1
K
  φ kτ   
∼
 (  A˜it ) k +  μ i τ ,
where “ ˜  ” represents a demeaned variable, e.g.,  ˜  A it =  A it −  _ A it and  _ A it is the 
mean allowance rate at the hearing office and on the day that case i was assigned 
and  ˜  ji    γ1,−i =  j i    γ1,−i −  
_
 j i    γ1,−i and  
_
 j i    γ1,−i is the mean value of  j i    γ1,−i at the hearing 
office and on the day that case i was assigned. We use polynomials when estimat-
ing marginal treatment effects because polynomials are straightforward to demean. 
We choose the order of polynomial K that minimizes Akaike’s information crite-
rion, ln   σ 2 + 2K/n and the Bayesian information criterion, ln (  σ 2 ) + K/n · ln(n ). 
Because of the well known endpoint problems with polynomials, we experimented 
with the order of the polynomial. We found that the results were largely unchanged 
when we increased or decreased the order of the polynomial by 1.
The instrument is  j i    γ1 from the equation
(22)   A i1 =  j i    γ1 +  X i  δ A1 +  e i1 ,
21 This is equivalent to taking residuals from first-stage regressions of  A it ,  y it on  X i .
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which implies
(23)  E [ A s1 |  X s ] = E [  j s   γ1 |  X s ] +  X s  δ A1 ,
for any given s and so
(24)  E [  j s   γ1 − E [  j s   γ1 |  X s ]] = E [ A s1 − E[ A s1 |  X s ]],
where the left-hand side object is E[  j s   γ1 − E[  j s   γ1 |  X s ]], the demeaned instrumental 
variable. We approximate the right-hand side object, but using the sample analog 
and leaving observation i out, as in a jackknife estimator, so the constructed instru-
ment is
(25)   ˜  ji    γ1,−i =  1 _  n j − 1    ∑  s ∈ , s ≠ i 
 
  A s1 −  _ A s1 ,
where  n j is the number of cases heard by judge  j i over the sample period,  is the set 
of cases heard by judge  j i , and   _  A s1 is the mean allowance rate by ALJs at case s’s 
hearing office on the day case s was heard. Doyle (2007) uses a similar approach. 
Because we remove case i from  ˜  ji    γ1,−i , as in a jackknife estimator, it should be 
independent of  η i and  μ i , even in a small sample.
Based on Monte Carlo experiments with what seemed reasonable parameters, the 
procedure produced accurate approximations in the linear models, as well as for the 
true MTE from the tenth to ninetieth percentiles of the distribution of the estimated 
judge allowance differentials, so we present estimates of the MTE over the middle 
80 percent of the data.
Appendix D: Using IV Estimates to Identify the Effect of ALJ Allowance 
on the Level of Labor Supply, Future Allowance, and Appeals
Level of Labor Supply.—The plim of the IV estimator is E[  y i τ |  A it = 1] − 
E[  y i τ |  A it = 0] where  y i τ is an outcome measure ( participation, earnings, allowance, 
or appeals) at time τ and  A it is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual was allowed 
at time t.
First, we describe identification of the effect of ALJ allowance on the level of 
labor supply. The estimation procedure described in Section IIIB identifies the 
change in earnings or participation caused by DI receipt. To obtain the level, note 
that the law of total probability gives
(26)  E [  y i τ ] = E [  y i τ |  A it = 1] Pr [  A it = 1] + E [  y i τ |  A it = 0] Pr [  A it = 0].
Furthermore, equation (2) shows that
(27)  E [ ϕ i τ ] = E [  y i τ |  A it = 1] − E [  y i τ |  A it = 0].
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Using equations (26) and (27), we can solve for the two unknowns:
(28)  E [  y i τ |  A it = 1] = E [  y i τ ] + E [ ϕ i τ ] Pr [ A it = 1]
(29)  E [  y i τ |  A it = 0] = E [  y i τ ] − E [ ϕ i τ ] Pr [ A it = 0].
We can identify E[  y i τ ], Pr[ A it = 1], Pr[ A it = 0] directly from the data. Our estimation 
procedure delivers E[ ϕ i τ ] for cases who are affected by our instrument. Assuming 
that E[ ϕ it ] for those affected by the instrument is the same as E[ ϕ it ] for those not 
affected by the instrument yields estimates of E[  y i τ |  A it = 1] and E[  y i τ |  A it = 0] for 
the full sample. This assumption is untestable, although Section VF gives evidence 
that E[ ϕ i τ ] does not vary much over the support of our data.
Future Allowance and Appeals.—Next, we describe identification of time t 
allowance on the level of future allowance and appeals. To do this we estimate equa-
tion (2), or in demeaned form, equation (5), where the left-hand side variable is 
time τ allowance  A iτ or appeals  a iτ and the coefficient on time t allowance  converges 
to E[ ϕ iτ ] for the set of individuals affected by the instrument. The regression 
coefficient identifies E[ ϕ iτ ] = E[  A iτ |  A it = 1] − E[  A iτ |  A it = 0]. Because allowance 
is a binary variable, and because allowance is an absorbing state, E[  A iτ |  A it = 1] = prob[ A iτ = 1 |  A it = 1] = 1. Thus, the regression coefficient identifies
(30)  E [  A iτ |  A it = 1] − E [  A iτ |  A it = 0] = 1 − prob [  A iτ = 1 |  A it = 0],
and so prob[ A iτ = 1 |  A it = 0] = 1 − E[ ϕ iτ ].
When considering appeals define  a iτ as an indicator equal to 1 if the individual 
was appealing at time τ. Then
(31)  E [ a iτ |  A it = 1] − E [ a iτ |  A it = 0] = 0 − E [ a iτ |  A it = 0]
  = −prob [ a iτ = 1 |  A it = 0],
and so prob[  A iτ = 1 |  A it = 0] = −E[ ϕ iτ ] where E[ ϕ iτ ] is the plim of the regression 
coefficient on the appeals equation. 
Appendix E: Calculation of the After-Tax Wage
We estimate after-tax wages as follows. We impute pretax wage income of 
 non-working DI applicants using a predictive mean matching regression approach, 
described in David et al. (1986). We first regress income y on the vector of observ-
able variables m described in Table 1, yielding y = mb + ϑ. Second, for each sam-
ple member i we calculate the predicted value   yi =  m i   b, and for each member with 
an observed value of  y i we calculate the residual   ϑi =  y i −   yi . Third, we sort the 
predicted value   yi into deciles. Fourth, for non-working individuals, we impute  ϑ i by 
finding a random individual j with a value of   yj in the same decile as   yi , and setting 
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ϑ i =   ϑj . The imputed value of  y i is   yi +   ϑj . We estimate models for DI and SSI ben-
eficiaries separately because the two groups face different labor supply incentives.
Once we impute pretax wage income for every member of the sample, we calcu-
late the after-tax wage. First, we use year, state, and the Social Security earnings data 
to calculate the DI/SSI benefit for everyone in the sample. We impute SSI benefits 
using state and year for those drawing SSI benefits. Second, we predict the distribu-
tion of posttax wages plus DI benefits (i.e., the difference between income if working, 
and income if not working) for everyone in our data using the federal, state, and local 
tax schedule shown in French and Jones (2011). Those who are allowed benefits will 
have DI benefits if predicted income from working is below the SGA limit ($6,000 
in 1993 to $9,360 in 2002). If income is above the SGA limit, then the individual 
will lose benefits. If the individual is denied benefits, then there are no DI benefits 
to be lost when working. We assume that SSI benefits above the disregard level are 
reduced $0.50 for each dollar of earnings, until all SSI benefits are lost. Third, we 
take the sample average after-tax wage if denied and allowed, which is our measure of 
E[ w i |  A i = 0] and E[ w i |  A i = 1]. Our main limitation on these measurements is that, 
ideally, we should know family structure and all sources of income to calculate taxes. 
Family structure is important because the DI/SSI benefit depends on marital status 
and the number of dependants. Unfortunately, we do not have this information, so we 
assume that the individual can claim no dependents for the DI/SSI benefit and is not 
pushed into a higher marginal tax bracket from spousal or other non-labor income.
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